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PROXY ADVISORS AS ISSUE SPOTTERS
Douglas Sarro*
ABSTRACT
When institutional investors hire proxy advisors to prepare reports on
matters up for vote at public company shareholder meetings, are they
interested primarily in acquiring a bottom-line recommendation on how to
vote, on which they can then blindly rely? Or in acquiring information that
will help them make their own voting decisions? Supporters of controversial
reforms introduced by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in
2019 and 2020 gravitate toward the former position, arguing that reform is
needed to discourage undue reliance on proxy advisor recommendations.
Opponents gravitate toward the latter position, arguing that additional
regulation generally is unnecessary given that institutional investors already
review their proxy advisors’ work product and make their own voting
decisions.
This article argues that neither of these positions presents a full picture
of proxy advisors’ role in shareholder voting, and puts forward a more
nuanced account that better reflects existing empirical evidence: institutional
investors tend to use proxy advisors first and foremost as issue spotters,
helping them distinguish (i) controversial matters that require a review of the
proxy advisor’s analysis and potentially other information sources from(ii)
non-controversial matters where they can vote in line with the proxy
advisor’s recommendation without undertaking further review. On this
account, proxy advisors do influence shareholder voting, but this influence
derives primarily from their ability to direct institutional investors’ attention
away from some proposals and toward others, rather than from institutional
investors’ following their recommendations in lockstep.
This account casts one common criticism of proxy advisors’ standards—
that they reflect a one-size-fits-all approach to corporate governance that
results in recommendations that do not reflect each public company’s unique
circumstances—in a new light that exposes potential problems unaddressed
by the SEC’s reforms. At the same time, it casts doubt on the usefulness of
many of the reforms introduced by the SEC, which appear to be predicated
on the flawed assumption that blind reliance on proxy advisor
recommendations is a serious problem.

* Bombardier Scholar and Graduate Fellow in Capital Markets Research, University of
Toronto Faculty of Law (douglas.sarro@utoronto.ca). The author previously was an associate at
Sullivan & Cromwell LLP in New York. Many thanks to Rory Gillis, Anthony Niblett, Poonam
Puri, Michael Thom and Ed Waitzer for helpful discussions and comments on earlier drafts of this
article. All errors are my own.
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INTRODUCTION
When institutional investors hire proxy advisors to prepare reports on
matters up for vote at public company shareholder meetings, 1 are they
interested primarily in acquiring a bottom-line recommendation on how to
vote, on which they can then blindly rely? Or are they more interested in
acquiring a digestible summary of relevant background information that will
help them make their own voting decisions?
Proponents of heightened proxy advisor regulation—like the
controversial reforms introduced by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) in 2019 and 20202—gravitate toward the former position.
For example, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce told Congress that institutional
investors “frequently follow [proxy advisors’] recommendations
automatically,” 3 and then-SEC Commissioner Daniel Gallagher has
expressed concern that institutional investors are “engaging in rote reliance
on proxy advisory firm recommendations.”4 According to this account, proxy
advisors—particularly their market leader, Institutional Shareholder Services
(ISS)—act as “de facto standard setters” exercising effective control of public
companies’ corporate governance despite having no economic stake in them.5
This mismatch, the account continues, necessitates new rulemaking that
discourages institutional investors from blindly relying on proxy advisor
recommendations.6
Opponents of increased proxy advisor regulation gravitate toward the
latter position, with the Council of Institutional Investors stating that
institutional investors typically use proxy advisor research “solely as a
supplement to their own evaluation of agenda items.” 7 According to this

1. A proxy advisor might be hired by the institutional investor directly, or indirectly through
an agent of the institutional investor. For example, a mutual fund will hire an investment adviser to
manage its assets, including by exercising voting rights attaching to these assets, and the investment
adviser will hire a proxy advisor to advise it on how best to exercise these voting rights.
2. See infra notes 66–69 and accompanying text.
3. Statement of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce on Examining the Market Power and Impact
of Proxy Advisory Firms at 8 (June 5, 2013), https://docs.house.gov/meetings/BA/BA16/2013
0605/100958/HHRG-113-BA16-Wstate-PittH-20130605.pdf [https://perma.cc/NZN2-RD3J]
[hereinafter U.S. Chamber of Commerce].
4. Daniel M. Gallagher, Comm’r, SEC, Remarks at Soc’y of Corp. Sec’ys. & Governance
Prof’ls, Seattle, WA (July 11, 2013), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch071113dmghtm [https:
//perma.cc/VD5Q-DAUM].
5. Letter from Tom Quaadman, Executive Vice President, Ctr. for Capital Mkts.
Competitiveness, to Vanessa A. Countryman, Sec’y, SEC at 1 (Jan. 31, 2020), https://www.sec.gov
/comments/s7-22-19/s72219-6730872-207435.pdf [https://perma.cc/2Y82-AHDW]; U.S. Chamber
of Commerce, supra note 3, at 8.
6. Timothy M. Doyle, The Realities of Robo-Voting, AM. COUNCIL FOR CAP. FORMATION 1,
10 (Nov. 2018) https://accfcorpgov.org/wp-content/uploads/ACCF-RoboVoting-Report_11_8_
FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/5BEU-X57W].
7. Letter via Email from Glenn Davis, Senior Research Assoc., Council of Institutional Inv’rs,
to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, SEC, at 6 (Oct. 14, 2010), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-1410/s71410-80.pdf [https://perma.cc/UXU9-2EE4] [hereinafter CII Letter].
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account, additional regulation of these “research providers” 8 is at best
unnecessary given that institutional investors already review their proxy
advisors’ work product and make their own voting decisions. And at worst,
it could impair the quality of shareholder oversight of public companies’
management by making proxy advisor research more costly or difficult to
obtain and use.9
Neither of these narratives seems to present a full picture of proxy
advisors’ role in shareholder voting. Judging from empirical research looking
at the relationships between proxy advisor recommendations and shareholder
voting, the difference between the average levels of shareholder support
received by proposals endorsed by ISS and those opposed by ISS is too
small—and varies too greatly depending on the type of proposal up for
vote—to be consistent with the notion that all, or even most, institutional
investors blindly rely on ISS’s recommendations. And while a minority of
institutional investors likely do blindly rely on ISS recommendations,
assertions that this minority could be large enough to materially influence
voting outcomes appear overblown. Proponents of this weakened version of
the blind reliance narrative focus on institutions’ assets under management
(AUM) as a measure of voting influence at public companies, even though
AUM includes holdings of fixed income and other non-equity asset classes
(which do not carry voting rights) and private equity (equity investments in
companies that are not publicly traded and, accordingly, are not covered by
proxy advisors). When one focuses on these investors’ collective holdings of
U.S. public equities—which appear to amount to well under 2% of U.S.
public market capitalization, based on a review of these investors’ public
disclosures—it becomes difficult to see how these holdings could materially
influence voting outcomes.10
Turning to the narrative that institutional investors use proxy advisors
merely as research providers—that is, aggregators of information these
investors use to make their own voting decisions—surveys of institutional
investors suggest that it is implausible that these investors apply equal
scrutiny to every proposal that comes up for a shareholder vote. 11 These
investors cite limited resources and the compressed time frame in which most
U.S. shareholder meetings occur as serious constraints on their ability to
make informed voting decisions.12 This evidence suggests investors likely
are taking shortcuts to make voting decisions.

8. Letter from Kenneth A. Bertsch, Exec. Dir., Council of Institutional Inv’rs, et al., to the Hon.
Jay Clayton, Chairman, SEC, et al., at 2 (Oct. 15, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/comments/4725/4725-6308155-193468.pdf [https://perma.cc/KC4D-ZBSC].
9. Id.
10. Infra Part II.B.
11. Infra Part II.C.
12. Id.
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More nuanced accounts of proxy advisors’ role in shareholder voting
have received little attention, 13 and their implications for proxy advisor
regulation even less.14 This article aims to remedy these gaps by expanding
on these accounts and exploring implications for reform. These implications
should be relevant to any review of the SEC’s reforms under the Biden
Administration,15 as well as the Administration’s review of the related (and
similarly controversial)16 late 2020 rulemaking by the Department of Labor
(DOL) on proxy voting by pension and other fiduciaries that are subject to
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).17
This article argues that institutional investors tend to use proxy advisors
as issue spotters that help them distinguish controversial matters from noncontroversial ones. When a proxy advisor’s recommendation aligns with that
of management, this signals that the vote is non-controversial and that the
investor can rely on the advisor’s recommendation without reviewing the
proxy advisor’s research or undertaking further analysis. In these
circumstances, the investor takes a shortcut to reach a quick, inexpensive
voting decision, and its behavior aligns with what the blind reliance narrative
would predict. When a proxy advisor’s recommendation opposes
13. For examples of these accounts, on which this article aims to elaborate, see Stephen Choi,
Jill Fisch & Marcel Kahan, Who Calls the Shots? How Mutual Funds Vote on Director Elections, 3
HARV. BUS. L. REV. 35, 65 (2013) [hereinafter Choi, Fisch & Kahan, Who Calls the Shots?] (“ISS’s
recommendations are influential because they focus shareholder attention, but not because
shareholders follow those recommendations blindly”); Yonca Ertimur, Fabrizio Ferri & David
Oesch, Understanding Uncontested Director Elections, 64 MGMT. SCI. 3400, 3402 (2018).
14. Rather, partisans on both sides of the debate have tended to cast empirical evidence on proxy
advisor influence as supporting their side of the debate. See, e.g., DOYLE, supra note 6, at 6; Letter
from Kevin Cameron, Exec. Chair, & Nichol Garzon-Mitchell, Senior Vice President & Gen.
Counsel, Glass, Lewis & Co., LLC, to Vanessa A. Countryman, Sec’y, SEC, at 29 (Feb. 3, 2020),
https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-22-19/s72219-6745349-207938.pdf [https://perma.cc/ND9KKH2D] [hereinafter Glass Lewis Letter].
15. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Biden and the SEC: Some Possible Agendas, The CLS Blue Sky
Blog (Dec. 2, 2020), https://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2020/12/02/biden-and-the-sec-somepossible-agendas/ [https://perma.cc/5KJZ-ET2W] (predicting that a review of the SEC’s proxy
advisor reforms will be an area of focus under the Biden Administration).
16. See, e.g., Robert A.G. Monks & Nell Minow, ValueEdge Advisors, Proxy Voting by ERISA
Fiduciaries, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Oct. 22, 2020), https://corpgov.
law.harvard.edu/2020/10/22/proxy-voting-by-erisa-fiduciaries/ [https://perma.cc/UB4Z-PLFK];
Letter from James C. Allen, Head, & Karina Karakulova, Sr. Manager, Capital Mkts. Pol’y –
Americas, CFA Inst., to Office of Regulations and Interpretations, Employee Benefits Security
Admin., Dept. of Labor, at 2 (Oct. 5, 2020), https://www.cfainstitute.org/-/media/documents/
comment-letter/2020-2024/20201005.ashx [https://perma.cc/5ZB8-JXVY]; DOL Issues Final
Proxy Voting Rule, GROOM L. GRP. (Dec. 22, 2020), https://www.groom.com/resources/dol-issuesfinal-proxy-voting-rule [https://perma.cc/9AV2-NRG4].
17. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Lab., US Department of Labor Releases Statement on
Enforcement of its Final Rules on ESG Investments, Proxy Voting by Employee Benefit Plans (Mar.
10, 2021), https://www.dol.gov/newsroom/releases/ebsa/ebsa20210310 [https://perma.cc/3YNPL7Y6] [hereinafter DOL Press Release]; Fiduciary Duties Regarding Proxy Voting and Shareholder
Rights, 85 Fed. Reg. 55,219 (proposed Sept. 4, 2020) [hereinafter DOL Proposed Rules]; Fiduciary
Duties Regarding Proxy Voting and Shareholder Rights, 85 Fed. Reg. 81,658 (Dec. 16, 2020)
[hereinafter DOL Final Rules]. This rulemaking is discussed briefly in infra Part I.D.
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management’s recommendation, this signals that the vote is controversial and
that the investor should examine the research presented in the proxy advisor’s
report, as well as other relevant information, to reach its own voting decision.
In these circumstances, the investor’s behavior aligns with what the research
provider narrative would predict. On this account, proxy advisors do
influence shareholder voting, but this influence derives primarily from their
ability to direct institutional investors’ attention away from some proposals
and toward others, not from institutional investors’ following proxy advisors’
recommendations in lockstep. This account is consistent with an assumption
that investors will tend to conserve the scarce resources they have to spend
on making voting decisions for those votes that are most in need of
independent analysis.
Adopting this account has at least three significant implications for proxy
advisor regulation. First, it turns on its head a frequent criticism of proxy
advisors’ standards—reflected in the SEC’s reforms—that their “one-sizefits-all” approach to corporate governance fails to account for the
circumstances of individual companies and investors’ diverse objectives.18
Critics say this tends to result in too many negative recommendations (i.e.,
recommendations to vote against the recommendations made by company
management). 19 One-size-fits-all standards that err on the side of
recommending against management will not lead to perfect
recommendations on how to vote, but they can serve to weed out the easy
cases—where the obvious answer is to vote with management—so that
investors can focus their attention on the closer cases that require companyspecific analysis, carried out in light of the investor’s objectives. Rather than
demonstrating the need for the types of reforms introduced by the SEC, these
standards can be viewed as reflecting institutional investors’ prudent use of
proxy advisors as issue spotters. Proxy advisors’ voting standards run into
trouble only if they result in too few negative recommendations. Despite
evidence suggesting this problem exists, potentially in part due to efforts by
public company managers to game or otherwise evade these standards,20 the
SEC appears to have overlooked it in developing its package of reforms. This
risk could be mitigated with guidance encouraging institutional investors to
review records of their past votes to identify potential weaknesses in their
proxy advisor’s voting standards and work with the proxy advisor to resolve
them.21

18. See, e.g., CTR. FOR CAPITAL MKTS. COMPETITIVENESS & NASDAQ, PROXY SEASON 2018:
EXAMINING DEVELOPMENTS & LOOKING FORWARD 3 (2018), https://www.centerforcapital
markets.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/ProxySeasonSurvey_v3_Digital.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6YNH-FJ6R].
19. Id.
20. See infra Part IV.B.
21. Technically, such SEC guidance would apply only to investment advisers. However, since
such guidance would be grounded in investment advisers’ duty to exercise voting rights prudently,
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Second, this account points toward a more focused regulatory approach
to the presentation and delivery of proxy advisor recommendations and
related communications than that adopted by the SEC. Reforms should focus
on helping institutional investors access new signals about the quality of
proxy advisors’ recommendations of which they would not otherwise have
been aware, instead of merely reminding them of obvious risks—such as
potential inaccuracies and conflicts of interest—that most investors already
address by, among other things, scrutinizing recommendations on
controversial matters. The SEC’s overbroad approach appears to flow from
the flawed assumption that institutional investors will blindly rely on proxy
advisor recommendations unless they are presented with unambiguous
signals that the value of these recommendations ought to be discounted.
Third, this account suggests that, instead of promulgating guidance that
could be viewed as effectively prescribing what steps all institutional
investors ought to take before casting votes, the SEC should focus its
attention on the small minority of institutional investors that appear to vote
in lockstep with proxy advisor recommendations. The SEC could reiterate
that investment advisers can agree with their clients not to exercise voting
rights to the extent they believe the costs of doing so likely will exceed the
benefits and add that in assessing these costs investment advisers should
consider the cost of independently reviewing proxy advisor
recommendations on controversial matters.
Part I of this article provides background on proxy advisors and the
evolution of their regulation in the United States. Part II critiques the blind
reliance and research provider accounts of proxy advisor influence in light of
empirical evidence. Part III introduces the argument that institutional
investors use proxy advisors as issue spotters, describing the contexts in
which proxy advisors are most likely to play this role and the limited
circumstances where they seem unlikely to play this role. Part IV describes
the policy implications that flow from this account of proxy advisor
influence.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF PROXY ADVISORS AND THEIR
REGULATION
Proxy advisors provide two core services to institutional investors: they
analyze and make voting recommendations on matters presented for
shareholder vote in a proxy statement (on the basis of guidelines developed
by the proxy advisor or customized by the client), and they provide
administrative machinery to facilitate investors’ casting and tracking their

a duty that is shared by other institutional investors, other institutional investors likely would look
to such guidance in determining how to comply with this duty. See infra Part II.A.
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votes. 22 Some proxy advisors also offer consulting services to public
companies (also referred to as “issuers”) on corporate governance or
executive compensation matters, typically aimed at gauging or increasing the
likelihood that management proposals on these matters will receive
shareholder approval.23 ISS is the world’s leading proxy advisor, with the
largest client base and broadest coverage of public companies.24 Glass Lewis
follows ISS with respect to client base and depth of company coverage.25
Public company management teams seek shareholder approval on a wide
variety of matters at annual shareholder meetings. First and foremost, they
need shareholders to elect management’s slate of director nominees to the
board.26 Even if the slate is running unopposed, shareholders can express
their displeasure with one or more of the nominees by voting to “Withhold”
their vote for the nominee(s).27 In addition, public companies generally are
required to seek shareholder approval of newly adopted equity compensation
plans, 28 and to hold non-binding shareholder votes to approve executive
compensation (referred to as “say-on-pay” votes) every year, every two
years, or every three years29 (as determined by shareholders every six years
in a “say-on-frequency” vote).30 Shareholders also are entitled to bring nonbinding proposals up for vote at each annual meeting.31 These shareholder
proposals address matters as diverse as executive compensation, corporate
governance, climate change, and labor rights. Activist investors also may use
shareholder meetings to initiate a contest for corporate control by running a
rival slate of director nominees against the slate of nominees aligned with
management (a “proxy contest”).

22. See, e.g., Institutional S’holder Servs., Proxy Voting Services, https://www.issgovernance.
com/solutions/proxy-voting-services/ [https://perma.cc/VTY8-43MK]; Institutional S’holder
Servs., Custom Policy and Research, https://www.issgovernance.com/solutions/governanceadvisory-services/custom-policy-research/ [https://perma.cc/Z4PQ-W6TB].
23. See generally ISS Corp. Sols., https://www.isscorporatesolutions.com [https://perma.cc/
W4FD-NTXZ].
24. See Asaf Eckstein & Sharon Hannes, A Long/Short Incentive Scheme for Proxy Advisory
Firms, 53 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 787, 793 (2018); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF.,
CORPORATE SHAREHOLDER MEETINGS: PROXY ADVISORY FIRMS’ ROLE IN VOTING AND
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRACTICES 6–7 (2016), https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/681050.pdf
[https://perma.cc/P7KJ-Z66S].
25. Eckstein & Hannes, supra note 24, at 793; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note
24, at 6–7.
26. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 211(b) (2009).
27. If the company has adopted a majority voting policy, a director that receives a majority of
“Withhold” votes generally must offer their resignation.
28. NYSE AMERICAN COMPANY GUIDE § 711; NASDAQ RULE 5635(c).
29. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-21(a) (2011).
30. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-21(b) (2011).
31. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2011).
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A. THE AVON LETTER AND THE RISE OF PROXY ADVISORS
Historically, shareholder votes were not controversial affairs.
Shareholder custom was to vote in accordance with the recommendations of
management—if a shareholder was dissatisfied with management, they had
an easy remedy available in selling their shares.32 This custom of investor
deference to management eroded significantly over the 1980s, with the rise
of mutual funds and other institutional investors that had the resources to
scrutinize and reach independent views on matters up for vote, and that
accordingly began using the shareholder voting process to express these
views.33 These institutional investors increasingly turned to proxy advisors
and other consultants and organizations to support these activities.34
But the rise of proxy advisors was not a result of market changes alone.
It was in large part a product of regulation.35 The DOL’s 1988 “Avon Letter”
is widely viewed as having provided the opening salvo. The letter opined that
“decision[s] as to how proxies should be voted” by the investment managers
of pension and health plans (overseen by the DOL pursuant to ERISA) “are
fiduciary acts of plan asset management.”36 Accordingly, in the DOL’s view,
managers must exercise these voting rights in accordance with their fiduciary
duties: “prudently, solely in the interest of the plan’s participants and
beneficiaries, and for the exclusive purpose of providing benefits to
participants and beneficiaries.”37 ISS, founded three years earlier, promised
to help managers vote proxies prudently and cost-effectively with research
and recommendations that managers otherwise might have been expected to
produce independently.38

32. Bayless Manning, The Shareholder’s Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for Frank Coker, 72
YALE L.J. 223, 261 (1962).
33. Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional Shareholder
Activism, 79 GEO. L.J. 445, 447–50 (1991).
34. Id. at 450.
35. Regulation also may have prevented alternative channels for producing the services proxy
advisors now provide, such as institutional investor trade groups, from arising. See Andrew F. Tuch,
Proxy Advisor Influence in a Comparative Light, 99 B.U. L. REV. 1459, 1496–1500 (2019)
(suggesting that less stringent rules regarding shareholder coordination in the United Kingdom may
explain why institutional investor trade groups play a dominant role in setting corporate governance
norms and why, as a result, proxy advisors appear less influential than in the United States).
36. Letter from Allan Lebowitz, Dep. Ass’t Sec’y of the Pension Welfare Benefits Admin. at
the U.S. Dep’t of Lab., to Helmuth Fandl, Chairman of the Ret. Bd., Avon Products, Inc., 1988 WL
897696 at *2 (Feb. 23, 1988).
37. Id. at *3 n.4. The Avon Letter was followed by the DOL’s Interpretive Bulletin No. 94-2
(codified at 29 C.F.R. § 2509.94-2), which among other things restated the views set out in the Avon
Letter. This guidance was updated in 2008 and 2016. Interpretive Bulletin Relating to Exercise of
Shareholder Rights, 73 Fed. Reg. 61,731 (Oct. 17, 2008); Interpretive Bulletin Relating to the
Exercise of Shareholder Rights and Written Statements Including Proxy Voting Policies or
Guidelines, 81 Fed. Reg. 95,879 (Dec. 29, 2016). The DOL revisited the issue with new rules
promulgated in December 2020. Infra Part I.D.
38. One of ISS’s co-founders, Robert A.G. Monks, laid much of the foundation for the Avon
Letter in his prior role as a senior official in the DOL. R. FRANKLIN BALOTTI, JESSE A.

2021]

Proxy Advisors as Issue Spotters

379

In a 2003 rulemaking (the Proxy Voting Rules),39 the SEC confirmed its
view that investment advisers that manage the assets of mutual funds and
other investment companies are subject to similar obligations:
The federal securities laws do not specifically address how an adviser
must exercise its proxy voting authority for its clients. Under the Advisers
Act, however, an adviser is a fiduciary that owes each of its clients duties of
care and loyalty with respect to all services undertaken on the client’s behalf,
including proxy voting.40
The Proxy Voting Rules fleshed out this obligation with new Rule
206(4)-6 under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (the Advisers Act)41
requiring investment advisers to adopt written policies and procedures
reasonably designed to ensure they vote proxies in the best interests of
clients. 42 The Proxy Voting Rules’ adopting release also suggested that
retaining a proxy advisor is not only permissible, but desirable as a means of
demonstrating that an investment adviser’s vote is not driven by conflicts of
interest: “an adviser could demonstrate that the vote was not a product of a
conflict of interest if it voted client securities, in accordance with a predetermined policy, based upon the recommendations of an independent third
party.”43
In addition to encouraging demand for proxy advisory services,
regulation operated on the supply side, removing legal barriers to the
provision of proxy advisory services. One such barrier was uncertainty over
whether proxy advisors’ reports are subject to the proxy solicitation rules
promulgated under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the Exchange
Act) 44 —in particular, Rule 14a-3’s requirement that any solicitation be
accompanied by a proxy statement. 45 In a 1992 rulemaking, 46 the SEC
created a new exemption from these rules and clarified the scope of another.
Proxy advisors that provide only research services to their clients could rely
FINKELSTEIN, GREGORY P. WILLIAMS & ALAN MILLER, MEETINGS OF STOCKHOLDERS § 12.5.1
(3d ed. 2021).
39. Proxy Voting by Investment Advisers, 68 Fed. Reg. 6585 (Feb. 7, 2003).
40. Id. at 6586.
41. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-21.
42. 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-6(a) (2003). The Proxy Voting Rules also require investment
advisers to disclose information to their clients about those policies and procedures, and how these
clients can find out how the adviser has voted their proxies. Proxy Voting by Investment Advisers,
supra note 39, at 6585. The rulemaking also introduced new Rule 204-2 under the Advisers Act,
requiring advisers to retain records of, among other things, votes they cast on behalf of clients and
any documents advisers prepared that were material to or memorialized the basis for their voting
decision. Id. at 6588. A companion rulemaking required investment companies to file annual voting
records with the SEC on Form N-PX, and to provide disclosure about how they vote proxies relating
to portfolio securities they hold. Disclosure of Proxy Voting Policies and Proxy Voting Records by
Registered Management Investment Companies, 68 Fed. Reg. 6564, 6569 (Feb. 7, 2003).
43. Proxy Voting by Investment Advisers, supra note 39, at 6588.
44. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78qq.
45. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3(a) (1974).
46. Regulation of Communications Among Shareholders, 57 Fed. Reg. 48,276 (Oct. 22, 1992).
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on new Rule 14a-2(b)(1), which exempts most communications with
shareholders from the proxy solicitation requirements so long as the person
making the communication does not seek authority to act as proxy for these
shareholders.47 Proxy advisors that offer clients a platform for casting votes
in tandem with research services could rely on revised Rule 14a-2(b)(3),
which exempts voting advice furnished by a person that “renders financial
advice in the ordinary course of business,” subject to compliance with certain
disclosure and other rules relating to possible conflicts of interest.48
A second relevant development was SEC guidance effectively permitting
proxy advisors to generate additional revenue by advising issuers on how to
align their corporate governance practices with their voting standards. In two
no-action letters delivered in 2004, the SEC staff (the Staff) clarified
expectations about how investment advisers should respond to potential
conflicts of interest between proxy advisors and their issuer clients so as to
comply with their obligation under the Proxy Voting Rules to exercise voting
rights in the best interests of their clients. In a letter delivered to a
representative of the proxy advisor Egan-Jones (the Egan-Jones Letter),49 the
Staff stated that investment advisers must assure themselves that a proxy
advisor can make recommendations “in an impartial manner and in the best
interests of the adviser’s clients” before following the proxy advisor’s
recommendations.50 One means of assuring themselves of a proxy advisor’s
independence, the Staff added, would be to require the proxy advisor to
disclose “any relevant facts” concerning its relationship with an issuer, “such
as the amount of the compensation that the firm has received or will receive”
from that issuer.51 In a subsequent letter delivered to a representative of ISS
(the ISS Letter),52 the Staff opined that advisers could, alternatively, gain this
assurance by undertaking “a thorough review of the proxy voting firm’s
conflict procedures and the effectiveness of their implementation.”53 The ISS
Letter is significant because it indicates that an investment adviser can rely
on a proxy advisor’s recommendations without inquiring into whether proxy
advisor provided services to the issuer that is the subject of these
recommendations, so long as the proxy advisor provides assurances that it
has implemented procedures sufficient to address any conflicts of interest that

47. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-2(b)(1) (2010).
48. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-2(b)(3) (2010). While Rule 14a-2(b)(3) preceded the 1992 rulemaking,
the SEC staff had taken the position that proxy advisors do not provide “financial advice” to their
clients (due to their advising only on the exercise of voting rights). Institutional S’holder Servs.,
Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1991 WL 179448 (Dec. 15, 1988). The 1992 rulemaking reversed this
position. Regulation of Communications Among Shareholders, supra note 46, at 48,282 n.41.
49. Egan-Jones Proxy Servs., SEC No-Action Letter, 2004 WL 1201240 (May 27, 2004).
50. Id. at *3.
51. Id. at *4.
52. Institutional S’holder Servs., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2004 WL 2093360 (Sept. 15,
2004).
53. Id. at *2.
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could arise from such a relationship (e.g., separating staff providing proxy
voting recommendations to advisers from staff providing governance advice
to issuers). 54 While this SEC guidance is addressed only to investment
advisers, other institutional investors are likely to regard this guidance as
reflective of their respective fiduciary obligations to their clients.55
B. THE SEC COURSE CORRECTS WITH STAFF LEGAL BULLETIN NO.
2
Over the decade following the ISS and Egan-Jones Letters, market and
regulatory developments further increased proxy advisors’ importance in
corporate democracy. First, corporate governance trends, such as majority
voting policies for board elections and “say-on-pay” votes approving
executive compensation, along with rising shareholder activism, increased
the stakes of shareholder votes. 56 Second, revisions to NYSE Rule 452
adopted in 2009 limiting brokers’ ability to vote uninstructed shares in
uncontested director elections removed a key constituency on which
corporate management typically could rely for support—brokers tended to
vote their clients’ shares in accordance with management recommendations
without seeking outside advice (in the absence of specific voting instructions
from their clients).57 Third, the continued growth of institutional investors
meant an ever greater percentage of votes cast at shareholder meetings would
be cast by clients of proxy advisors.58
Critics offered at least three reasons why institutional investors’ apparent
reliance on proxy advisors might be misplaced: (i) conflicts of interest arising
from proxy advisors’ providing services to both investors and issuers may
lead them to provide biased voting advice that favors their issuer clients;
(ii) their methodologies for generating voting recommendations reflect a
dubious one-size-fits-all approach to governance that fails to recognize that
good governance may mean different things for different companies in
different contexts; and (iii) proxy advisors’ recommendations may be based
on mistaken or otherwise flawed understandings of relevant information.59

54. Id.
55. See Roberta S. Karmel, Should a Duty to the Corporation be Imposed on Institutional
Shareholders?, 60 BUS. LAW. 1, 2 (2004) (“Institutional shareholders are not investing their own
capital, but the capital of others to whom they owe fiduciary duties.”).
56. Michael Cappucci, The Proxy War Against Proxy Advisors, 16 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 579,
614–15 (2020). A majority voting policy generally requires director nominees to resign if they fail
to receive a majority of votes “For” their election (i.e., as a result of shareholders voting to
“Withhold” support for the nominee), even if the election was uncontested.
57. Id. at 615.
58. Id. at 582–83.
59. See, e.g., CTR. ON EXEC. COMP., A CALL FOR CHANGE IN THE PROXY ADVISORY INDUSTRY
STATUS QUO: THE CASE FOR GREATER ACCOUNTABILITY AND OVERSIGHT 42–61, WALL ST. J.
(2011),
http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/ProxyAdvisoryWhitePaper02072011.pdf
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Staff Legal Bulletin No. 20 (SLB 20),60 issued in 2014, may be viewed
as a response to these concerns. SLB 20 provided additional guidance on
investment advisers’ due diligence obligations with respect to their
relationships with proxy advisors. The Staff opined that an adviser’s
obligations to its clients require it to conduct diligence on a proxy advisor to
ensure the proxy advisor has “the capacity and competency to adequately
analyze proxy issues,” both prior to hiring the proxy advisor and on an
ongoing basis. 61 This diligence review should cover “the adequacy and
quality of the proxy advisory firm’s staffing and personnel” as well as its
policies and procedures for ensuring the accuracy and independence of its
recommendations.62 The Staff also suggested that investment advisers should
review their voting policies and procedures at least annually, and that this
review could include “periodically sampling proxy votes to review whether
they complied with the investment adviser’s proxy voting policy and
procedures.”63 In short, SLB 20 made clear the Staff’s view that purchasing
and relying on proxy advisor recommendations is not enough to satisfy
investment advisers’ obligations under the Proxy Voting Rules; investment
advisers must also bear the ongoing, additional cost of monitoring their proxy
advisors. The Staff added that if an investment adviser believes undertaking
these costs is not in its clients’ best interests, then the adviser can agree with
its clients that it will not vote some or all of the shares it holds on behalf of
its clients.64
C. POST-2 16 SEC REFORMS
Following the 2016 U.S. presidential election and subsequent nomination
and confirmation of Jay Clayton as SEC Chairman, the SEC announced a
series of measures rolling back previous guidance and proposing to substitute
new, more burdensome proxy advisor regulation and guidance. This began
with the withdrawal of the ISS and Egan-Jones Letters in September 2018,65
and was followed by the introduction of two new interpretive releases in
August 2019, 66 and proposed rules (the Proposed Rules) published in
[https://perma.cc/SR7Z-K6UR]; Paul Rose, The Corporate Governance Industry, 32 J. CORP. L.
101, 120–33 (2007).
60. SEC Staff Legal Bulletin No. 20 (IM/CF) (June 30, 2014), https://www.sec.gov
/interps/legal/cfslb20.htm [https://perma.cc/J4FJ-5NN9] [hereinafter SLB 20].
61. Id. at Question 3.
62. Id.
63. Id. at Question 1.
64. Id. at Question 2.
65. Public Statement, SEC, Statement Regarding Staff Proxy Advisory Letters (Sept. 13,
2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/statement-regarding-staff-proxy-advisoryletters [https://perma.cc/9RRL-2FU7].
66. Commission Interpretation and Guidance Regarding the Applicability of the Proxy Rules to
Proxy Voting Advice, 84 Fed. Reg. 47,416 (Sept. 10, 2019) [hereinafter Proxy Advisor Guidance
(2019)]; Commission Guidance Regarding Proxy Voting Responsibilities of Investment Advisers,
84 Fed. Reg. 47,420 (Sept. 10, 2019) [hereinafter Investment Adviser Guidance (2019)].
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November 2019,67 with corresponding final rules (the Final Rules) published,
together with an additional interpretive release,68 in July 2020.69
Together, these actions may be seen as targeting three broad concerns:
(i) institutional investors do not have the information necessary to evaluate
whether a proxy advisor’s conflicts of interest may be affecting the
objectivity of its recommendations, (ii) institutional investors that hire proxy
advisors to provide both research and voting services (the latter of which
often entails “pre-populating” an investor’s electronic proxy forms to reflect
the proxy advisor’s voting recommendations) are not quality checking the
pre-populated forms before casting their votes, and (iii) institutional investors
are unduly relying on proxy advisor recommendations that are inaccurate or
otherwise flawed.
The withdrawal of the Egan-Jones and ISS Letters removed the comfort
these letters had provided that investment advisers could rely on proxy
advisors’ recommendations without inquiring into conflicts of interest
specific to these recommendations. The August 2019 interpretive releases
went further by suggesting that proxy advisors should provide, and
investment advisers should request, information about a proxy advisor’s
material conflicts of interest regardless of whether the proxy advisor has
measures in place to prevent these conflicts from affecting its objectivity.70
This view was codified in the Final Rules.71
One of the SEC’s August 2019 interpretive releases suggested that, as
part of their obligation to prudently exercise their voting rights, investment
advisers could sample votes that have been pre-populated by a proxy advisor
to ensure compliance with the investment adviser’s policies and procedures
before these votes are cast.72 More generally, the SEC added that investment
advisers could subject proxy contests and other matters relating to corporate
control to a “higher degree of analysis” than other proposals, and adopt
Interpretive releases, though issued by the Commission (rather than the Staff), are a form of
guidance, and accordingly are not legally binding or subject to notice-and-comment.
67. Amendments to Exemptions from the Proxy Rules for Proxy Voting Advice, 84 Fed. Reg.
66,518 (proposed Dec. 4, 2019) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240) [hereinafter Proposed Rules].
68. Supplement to Commission Guidance Regarding Proxy Voting Responsibilities of
Investment Advisers, 85 Fed. Reg. 55,155 (Sept. 3, 2020) [hereinafter Supplemental Investment
Adviser Guidance (2020)].
69. Exemptions from the Proxy Rules for Proxy Voting Advice, 84 Fed. Reg. 55,082 (Sept. 3,
2020) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240) [hereinafter Final Rules]. Proxy advisors will be expected
to comply with the Final Rules beginning December 1, 2021. Id. at 55,122.
70. Investment Adviser Guidance (2019), supra note 66, at 47,425; Proxy Advisor Guidance
(2019), supra note 66, at 47,419.
71. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-2(b)(9)(i)(A), 240.14a-9, Note (e) (2020). The SEC’s basis for directly
regulating proxy advice is that proxy advice constitutes a solicitation of a proxy under Rule 14a-1,
and as a result must (i) fall within the Rule 14a-2(b)(1) or (b)(3) exemptions from the general
requirement that such solicitations be accompanied by a proxy statement, and (ii) comply with the
Rule 14a-9 antifraud rules. See Proxy Advisor Guidance (2019), supra note 66, at 47,417; 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14a-1(l)(1)(iii)(A) (2020).
72. Investment Adviser Guidance (2019), supra note 66, at 47,424.
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policies and procedures “that provide for consideration of additional
information that may become available” about proposals after they receive
their proxy advisor’s recommendation, such as supplemental proxy filings by
the issuer in response to the recommendation. 73 The SEC’s July 2020
interpretive release expanded on this latter point, stating that investment
advisers should consider having policies and procedures in place to ensure
that any material information filed by an issuer in response to a proxy advisor
recommendation factors into their decision-making process before they vote,
provided that information is filed “sufficiently in advance of the submission
deadline.”74
The Proposed Rules also conditioned proxy advisors’ reliance on the
Rule 14a-2(b)(1) and (b)(3) exemptions on their implementation of a series
of processes that generally would give issuers (i) an opportunity to review
and comment on a draft version of the proxy advisor’s report, (ii) early access
to the final report before it is sent to the proxy advisor’s clients, and
(iii) the ability to require the proxy advisor to include in its report a hyperlink
to the issuer’s response to that report, if any.75 The Final Rules walked these
proposals back somewhat, requiring instead that proxy advisors adopt
policies and procedures reasonably designed to (i) ensure issuers receive
copies of their reports no later than the time these reports are disseminated to
clients, and (ii) provide clients with a mechanism through which they can be
made aware of the issuer’s response in a timely manner before the relevant
shareholder meeting.76 For example, if the issuer notifies the proxy advisor
that it intends to file such a response as additional soliciting materials, the
proxy advisor can pass this notice along to clients, and then pass along a
hyperlink to the response when available. 77 Finally, the Final Rules
implemented the proposal made in the Proposed Rules to amend the Note to
Rule 14a-9 to state that a proxy advisor’s failure to disclose to its clients
material information about its methodology and conflicts of interest could
render its advice materially misleading.78
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id.
Supplemental Investment Adviser Guidance (2020), supra note 68, at 55,156.
Proposed Rules, supra note 67, at 66,530–34, 66,538.
Final Rules, supra note 69, at 55,108–13; 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-2(b)(9)(ii) (2020). The proxy
advisor can condition its providing copies of such reports on the issuer filing its proxy statement at
least 40 days before the meeting date and agreeing that it will use any report provided to it only for
internal purposes or in connection with the solicitation. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-2(b)(9)(iii) (2020).
These requirements do not apply to voting recommendations developed on the basis of a “custom”
voting policy adopted by the investor. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-2(b)(9)(v) (2020). What constitutes a
“custom” voting policy may prove to be a matter for debate, given that custom voting policies are
anecdotally believed to be, for the most part, highly similar to proxy advisors’ standard form
policies. Adam O. Emmerich, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, Initial Perspectives and
Implications of SEC Proxy Advisory Reform, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Aug. 8,
2020), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/08/08/initial-perspectives-and-implications-of-secproxy-advisory-reform/ [https://perma.cc/73AT-Y24X].
77. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-2(b)(9)(iv) (2020).
78. Final Rules, supra note 69, at 55,118–19; 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9, Note (e) (2020).
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Taken together, these measures appear to reflect a belief that institutional
investors, or at least some substantial minority of institutional investors, are
blindly relying on proxy advisors’ recommendations and that regulatory
action is needed to stop them from continuing to do so. On this view,
additional disclosures regarding conflicts of interest are necessary because
institutional investors cannot be relied on to demand sufficient information
to judge the objectivity of proxy advisors’ recommendations on their own,
additional guidance regarding pre-populated votes is necessary to stop
institutional investors from allowing their votes to be automatically cast in
ways that do not reflect their true preferences and do not reflect all
information material to their voting decisions, and mechanisms requiring
proxy advisors to communicate issuers’ responses to their reports to their
institutional investor clients are necessary because these investors cannot be
relied upon to seek out this information on their own.
D. POSTSCRIPT: THE DOL’S DECEMBER 2 2 RULEMAKING
While this article focuses on the SEC’s 2019 and 2020 reforms, a brief
mention of the DOL’s subsequent rulemaking on proxy voting by ERISA
fiduciaries is warranted. Citing concerns about a “misunderstanding that
exists on the part of some stakeholders that ERISA fiduciaries are required
to vote all proxies,” 79 and “that fiduciaries may be over-relying on proxy
advisory firms as a result of such confusion, by implementing advisory firms’
voting recommendations without attention to whether the firms’ policies are
consistent with the economic interests of the plan,” 80 particularly when it
comes to shareholder proposals reflecting “environmental, social, or public
policy agendas,”81 the DOL, led by then-Secretary Eugene Scalia, introduced
new requirements governing the exercise of voting rights by ERISA
fiduciaries. The DOL’s final rules restrict fiduciaries’ discretion to consider
environmental, social, and governance factors when exercising voting rights
and require them to, among other things, “[c]onsider any costs involved” in
voting and “[e]valuate material facts that form the basis for any particular
proxy vote or other exercise of shareholder rights” (e.g., management’s
response to a negative proxy advisor recommendation). 82 Fiduciaries that
choose to retain a proxy advisor are required to exercise “prudence” in
selecting a proxy advisor and monitoring that proxy advisor’s activities.83
Fiduciaries are barred from adopting a practice of following their proxy
advisor’s recommendations without determining that the advisor’s voting
standards are consistent with the proxy voting principles listed in the final
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

DOL Final Rules, supra note 17, at 81,660.
DOL Final Rules, supra note 17, at 81,662.
DOL Proposed Rules, supra note 17, at 55,222.
29 C.F.R. § 2550.404a-1(e)(2)(ii) (2020).
29 C.F.R. §§ 2550.404a-1(e)(2)(ii)(F), 2550.404a-1(e)(2)(iii) (2020). The rules do not
prescribe what specific steps a fiduciary should take to monitor these activities.
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rules.84 The rules also provide fiduciaries with safe harbors allowing them to
adopt a policy of casting votes only on particular types of high-stakes
proposals (e.g., proposals affecting corporate control), or refraining from
voting when the plan’s holdings in the relevant company fall below a given
portion of the plan’s assets, or both, without giving rise to doubt over whether
these practices satisfy their fiduciary responsibilities under ERISA.85 Firms
will have until 2022 to begin complying with the new rules.86
The rushed timing of the rulemaking—proposals were published on
August 31 with a 30-day window for submitting comments, and were
finalized in mid-December—leaves the impression that the DOL was racing
to finalize these rules before the expiration of President Trump’s term. Under
President Biden, the DOL announced in March 2021 that it would be
revisiting the new rules, and would not be enforcing them in the interim,87
opening the way for a more fulsome consideration of these rules’ possible
effects on institutional investors’ exercise of their voting rights.
II. EVALUATING THE MAINSTREAM NARRATIVES OF PROXY
ADVISOR INFLUENCE
Returning to the SEC’s package of reforms, if either of the following two
versions of the blind reliance narrative are true, the reforms would appear
warranted. The first is a strong version of the narrative, which claims that it
is typical for institutional investors to blindly rely on proxy advisor
recommendations. The second is a weak version of the narrative, which
suggests that even if only a minority of institutional investors blindly follow
proxy advisor recommendations, this minority is large enough to be material
to the outcome of a shareholder vote. Proponents of both versions of this
narrative cite empirical evidence to support their claims. For example, the
U.S. Chamber of Commerce cites the significant swings in investor opinion
that tend to accompany a negative recommendation from a proxy advisor
(e.g., a recommendation to vote against a proposal submitted by
management) as “an obvious reflection of the fact that ISS’ and Glass Lewis’
institutional clients frequently follow these firms’ recommendations
automatically.” 88 The American Council for Capital Formation (ACCF),
while shying away from making general claims about institutional investors’
reliance on ISS recommendations, emphasizes the potential influence
exercised by a minority of investors that appear to vote in full alignment with
ISS recommendations: “firms representing trillions of [dollars of] assets

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

29 C.F.R. § 2550.404a-1(e)(2)(iv) (2020).
29 C.F.R. § 2550.404a-1(e)(3) (2020).
29 C.F.R. § 2550.404a-1(g)(3) (2020).
DOL Press Release, supra note 17.
U.S. Chamber of Commerce, supra note 3, at 8.
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under management are voting their shares almost exactly in line with proxy
advisors’ recommendations.”89
Opponents of additional proxy advisor regulation paint a markedly
different picture of proxy advisors’ role in the voting process. They
characterize proxy advisors’ role as that of research provider—far from
dictating the outcomes of shareholder votes, they merely collect and organize
information that institutional investors use to make voting decisions. 90
According to this account, voting decisions are made by institutional
investors, not proxy advisors, and accordingly claims that proxy advisor
recommendations effectively dictate the outcomes of shareholder votes are
mistaken.
This Part critiques each of these narratives in light of empirical evidence.
With respect to the strong version of the blind reliance narrative, it notes that
the vote swings empirical researchers have associated with ISS
recommendations fall well short of even a conservative measure of ISS’s
total client base, suggesting that a significant bloc of ISS’s clients can be
expected, on any given vote, to break with ISS and vote with management
when ISS and management issue opposing recommendations. This is not
consistent with the strong version of the blind reliance narrative. With respect
to the weak version of the blind reliance narrative, it accepts that a minority
of institutional investors appear to blindly follow ISS recommendations, but
takes issue with the notion that AUM provides an accurate measure of these
investors’ voting influence. It uses these investors’ SEC filings on Form 13F
and other disclosures to arrive at what should be a more accurate estimate of
these investors’ voting influence and concludes that these investors’ holdings
of U.S. public equities appear too small to have a material impact on the
outcomes of shareholder votes at U.S. public companies. Finally, while it
appears that the research provider narrative has at least some power in
explaining how institutional investors use proxy advisors, it may not explain
all, or even most, of the voting decisions investment advisers make. Surveys
of institutional investors highlighting their limited resources for
independently evaluating every voting decision they are required to make,91
together with institutional investors’ near-unanimous support for
management proposals that are endorsed by ISS, 92 suggest that it is
implausible that institutional investors apply independent scrutiny to every
proposal that comes up for a shareholder vote.

89.
90.
91.
92.

Doyle, supra note 6, at 5–7.
See, e.g., Glass Lewis Letter, supra note 14, at 29.
Infra Part II.C.
Infra Part II.C, Table 3.
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A. THE STRONG VERSION OF THE BLIND RELIANCE NARRATIVE
If ISS’s clients tend to blindly rely on its recommendations (regardless
of the nature of the recommendation), then most of its clients will vote in
favor of proposals that ISS supports, and vote against proposals that ISS
opposes. As such, the difference between the average level of support
received by ISS-supported proposals and ISS-opposed proposals should
approximate the proportion of the vote controlled by ISS’s client base. In
theory, we could arrive at a rough measure of this figure by dividing the total
public equity assets managed by ISS’s clients by the global market
capitalization of public equities. The challenge is that, while ISS disclosed
that it had over 2,000 institutional investor clients as of 2020,93 it has not
published a recent estimate of the size of its clients’ public equity
investments. The U.S. Government Accountability Office, however,
published an estimate of this amount in June 2007—$25.5 trillion—based on
information provided by ISS.94 This figure represents roughly 40–50% of the
global market capitalization of public equities at the time, depending on
whether one uses December 31, 2006, or December 31, 2007, as a reference
point.95
This 40–50% range likely understates the potential impact of ISS’s
recommendations on shareholder voting, at a minimum for votes occurring
in 2007 or later. First, proxy advisors’ clients are institutional investors,
which are significantly more likely to exercise their voting rights than other
investors.96 As such, their voting influence should be larger than reflected in
their share of equity holdings. Second, ISS’s client base appears to have, at a
minimum, held flat since 2007, and more likely has expanded since this time.
Over this period, it added approximately 300 new clients,97 and it remains
acknowledged as the clear market leader in the provision of proxy advice.98
Because Glass Lewis, widely viewed as second to ISS in market share, does
publish estimates of its own clients’ public equity assets, it is possible to
arrive at a floor for measuring the size of ISS’s current client base. Glass
Lewis’s most recent estimate was over $35 trillion,99 representing roughly
93. Cappucci, supra note 56, at 590.
94. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., CORPORATE SHAREHOLDER MEETINGS: ISSUES
RELATING TO FIRMS THAT ADVISE INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS ON PROXY VOTING 5 (2007),
https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-07-765 [https://perma.cc/7A77-LDQL].
95. World Bank, Market capitalization of listed domestic companies (current US$),
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/CM.MKT.LCAP.CD [https://perma.cc/K84Q-UJA9].
96. BROADRIDGE & PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, PROXYPULSE: 2019 PROXY SEASON
REVIEW 5 (2019), https://www.broadridge.com/_assets/pdf/broadridge-proxypulse-2019-review.
pdf [https://perma.cc/7H82-HPC8].
97. Compare U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 94, at 13 (estimating that ISS had
approximately 1,700 clients as of 2007), with Cappucci, supra note 56, at 590 (citing ISS estimate
that it had over 2,000 clients as of 2020).
98. See, e.g., Eckstein & Hannes, supra note 24, at 793.
99. Company Overview, GLASS LEWIS, https://www.glasslewis.com/company-overview/
[https://perma.cc/8YWM-YK6K].
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42% of global market capitalization as of the end of 2019,100 falling within
our 40–50% range. The DOL’s 2020 rulemaking provides a measure of
additional confidence that this range is a conservative one, as it claimed offhand that ISS “controls approximately 60 percent of the market”—the DOL
did not, however, describe how it arrived at this figure or how it chose to
define “control” or “the market.”101
There are two complicating factors, however. One is that some of ISS’s
clients have adopted custom proxy voting policies and rely on ISS to develop
recommendations based on these policies rather than ISS’s in-house policies.
Thus, at least some of ISS’s clients’ divergence from general ISS
recommendations may reflect clients’ blind reliance on ISS’s application of
these custom policies rather than clients’ independent review of ISS
recommendations. Anecdotal evidence that these custom voting policies tend
to diverge only in minor ways from proxy advisors’ general guidelines,102
however, provides a degree of comfort that clients with custom voting
policies will not receive radically different sets of proxy advisor
recommendations than their peers. A second complicating factor is that,
assuming ISS’s client base tends to grow over time, the 40–50% threshold
applied here may overestimate ISS’s potential influence in votes that
occurred prior to 2007. This threshold may be of especially limited value for
votes that occurred prior to the adoption of the Proxy Voting Rule in 2003
and the issuance of the ISS and Egan-Jones Letters in 2004, as these
developments are regarded as pivotal in encouraging institutional investors
to hire proxy advisors.103
With these cautions in mind, the table below introduces 11 studies
looking at the impact proxy advisors’ recommendations have on shareholder
voting, segmented by the type of proposal forming the focus of each study.
The table lists the types of proposals and time periods reviewed in each study
and, to the extent described in the study, (i) the difference between the
average level of shareholder support garnered by proposals receiving a
favorable ISS recommendation and the average support garnered by
100. Jesse Pound, Global stock markets gained $17 trillion in value in 2019, CNBC (Dec. 24,
2019),
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/12/24/global-stock-markets-gained-17-trillion-in-value-in2019.html [https://perma.cc/BQ2C-W83L] (citing data from Deutsche Bank Research).
101. DOL Proposed Rule, supra note 17, at 55,222. For example, does “the market” mean all
investors, or just institutional investors? Does it refer to the U.S. only, or the world? What does
“control” mean? Simply that investors have hired ISS as their proxy advisor, or something more?
The DOL’s rule proposal did not offer a response to any of these questions.
102. Letter from Darla C. Stuckey, President & CEO, Soc. for Corp. Gov., to Vanessa A.
Countryman, Sec’y, SEC, at 8 n. 8 (Feb. 3, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-2219/s72219-6743687-207853.pdf [https://perma.cc/W2U5-2XBN] [hereinafter Society for
Corporate Governance Letter]. See also Frank M. Placenti, Squire Patton Boggs, Are Proxy
Advisors really a Problem? HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Nov. 7, 2018),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/11/07/are-proxy-advisors-really-a-problem
[https://perma.cc/X72W-N424].
103. See, e.g., Eckstein & Hannes, supra note 24, at 795; Cappucci, supra note 56, at 587.
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proposals receiving an unfavorable recommendation, and (ii) any
correlations the study’s authors found between ISS recommendations and
level of support. Studies that examine more than one type of proposal are
listed more than once. Reflecting the diminished relevance of the 40–50%
threshold for votes occurring prior to 2007, and the likely significance of the
2003 Proxy Voting Rule and the 2004 Egan-Jones and ISS Letters for proxy
advisors’ growth, I have excluded from consideration studies that look
exclusively at votes occurring prior to these regulatory developments.
Table 1: Studies Measuring ISS Influence on Voting Outcomes
Proposal
Type

Authors Year

Time
Period

Uncontested
directors’
elections

Cai, Garner &
Walkling (2009)104
Choi, Fisch &
Kahan (2010)105

2003–2005
2005–2006

-20.3%

-6.4% to -13.1%

Ertimur, Ferri &
Oesch (2018)106
Copland, Larcker &
Tayan (2018)107
Thomas, Palmiter &
Cotter (2012)108
Malenko & Shen
(2016)109

2003–2010

-21.1%

-20.6% to -20.8%

2017

-18.3%

N/A

2003–2010

-19%

N/A

2010–2011

-24.3%

-25%

Say-on-pay

Possible Effects of Negative ISS
Recommendation
Difference
Correlation with
in Average
Level of Support
Support
-18.7%
-8.5% / -20.7%

104. Jie Cai, Jacqueline L. Garner & Ralph A. Walkling, Electing Directors, 64 J. FIN. 2389,
2395, 2401, 2403, 2406–07 (2009). See infra text accompanying notes 121–122 for a description of
the two regressions undertaken by the authors (and resulting correlation coefficients).
105. Stephen Choi, Jill Fisch & Marcel Kahan, The Power of Proxy Advisors: Myth or Reality?,
59 EMORY L.J. 869, 885, 903, 907 (2010) [hereinafter Choi, Fisch & Kahan, Myth or Reality?].
106. Ertimur, Ferri & Oesch, supra note 13, at 3403–04.
107. JAMES R. COPLAND, DAVID F. LARCKER & BRIAN TAYAN, PROXY ADVISORY FIRMS:
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE AND THE CASE FOR REFORM 12 (2018), https://media4.manhattan-institute
.org/sites/default/files/R-JC-0518-v2.pdf [https://perma.cc/GTT5-3JYH].
108. Randall S. Thomas, Alan R. Palmiter & James F. Cotter, Dodd-Frank’s Say on Pay: Will it
Lead to a Greater Role for Shareholders in Corporate Governance?, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1213,
1244 (2012). Figures reflect votes on management proposals only; results relating to shareholder
proposals are discussed in Part III.B, infra.
109. Nadya Malenko & Yao Shen, The Role of Proxy Advisory Firms: Evidence from a
Regression-Discontinuity Design, 29 REV. FIN. STUD. 3394, 3399, 3404 (2016).
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Cotter, Palmiter &
Thomas (2013)110

2011

-28.3%

-26.7%

Ertimur, Ferri &
Oesch (2013)111
Larcker, McCall &
Ormazabal
(2014)112

2011

-26.8%

-24.8%

2011

N/A

-22%

Fisch, Palia &
Davidoff Solomon
(2018)113

2011–2016

N/A

-30.8%

Copland, Larcker &
Tayan (2018)114

2017

-27.7%

N/A

Copland, Larcker &
Tayan (2018)115
Brav, Jiang, Li &
Pinnington
(2019)116
Copland, Larcker &
Tayan (2018)117

2017

-17.3%

N/A

2008–2015

-39.7%

N/A

2017

-73%

N/A

In all these studies except two, the difference in average support
depending on whether ISS recommended for or against management fell
short of our 40–50% threshold, ranging from 17.3% to 28.3%. The two
exceptions are the Brav, Jiang, Li & Pinnington study, which looks
exclusively at voting by U.S. mutual funds (making the 40–50% threshold an
inappropriately low benchmark given that most mutual funds would be
expected to hire a proxy advisor),118 and the portion of the Copland, Larcker
& Tayan study looking at proxy contests, which should be regarded with little
weight given how few proxy contests fell within the scope of their study
110. James F. Cotter, Alan R. Palmiter & Randall S. Thomas, The First Year of ‘Say on Pay’
Under Dodd-Frank: An Empirical Analysis and Look Forward, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 967, 989,
991 (2013).
111. Yonca Ertimur, Fabrizio Ferri & David Oesch, Shareholder Votes and Proxy Advisors:
Evidence from Say on Pay, 51 J. ACCT’G. RES. 951, 976 (2013).
112. David F. Larcker, Allan L. McCall & Gaizka Ormazabal, Outsourcing Shareholder Voting
to Proxy Advisory Firms, 58 J. L. & ECON. 173, 185 (2013).
113. Jill Fisch, Darius Palia & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Is Say on Pay All About Pay? The
Impact of Firm Performance, 8 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 101, 117 (2018).
114. Copland, Larcker & Tayan, supra note 107, at 12.
115. Id.
116. Alon Brav, Wei Jiang, Tao Li & James Pinnington, Picking Friends Before Picking (Proxy)
Fights: How Mutual Fund Voting Shapes Proxy Contests 17 (European Corp. Governance Inst.,
Fin. Working Paper No. 601/2019, 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3101473. The 39.7% figure
reflects the difference in average support among mutual funds, not investors generally.
117. Copland, Larcker & Tayan, supra note 107, at 12.
118. Brav, Jiang, Li & Pinnington, supra note 116, at 1.
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(37).119 Setting these exceptions aside, it appears that a substantial portion of
ISS’s clients generally can be expected to break with ISS and side with
management when ISS issues a negative voting recommendation. Perhaps
more importantly, the vote swings observed in the event of a negative
recommendation from ISS also seem to vary substantially depending on the
nature of the proposal being voted on, with uncontested directors’ elections
showing vote swings that average between 18.3% and 21.1%, and say-onpay votes showing vote swings averaging largely in the mid-to-high 20s. This
suggests many institutional investors place different weights on ISS’s
recommendations in different circumstances, again inconsistent with the
strong version of the blind reliance narrative.
Studies that aim to measure the correlation between ISS
recommendations and voting outcomes—controlling for factors that might
influence both ISS’s recommendation and the subsequent shareholder vote,
such as a firm’s financial performance and various indicators of good
corporate governance, or factors that might influence the vote regardless of
ISS’s recommendation, such as a recommendation from a different proxy
advisor—cast further doubt on this version of the narrative. While their
results vary widely, from 6.4% to 30.8%, they all fall short of our 40–50%
threshold. What is more, at least one of these studies suggests that investors’
likelihood of voting in line with an ISS recommendation depends in part on
the rationale ISS offers for its recommendation, suggesting that investors pay
attention not only to the direction but also to the reasoning behind ISS’s
recommendations when casting votes.120
The strength of the correlation one finds depends on the factors one uses
as controls. For example, Cai, Garner & Walkling ran two separate sets of
regressions: one focused on company-specific factors that might explain
voting outcomes for a slate of management nominees in an uncontested
directors’ election, and the other focused on director-specific factors that
might explain the vote share received by a specific nominee. They found that
if ISS recommends “Withhold” in respect of 100% of the director nominees
at a company in an uncontested directors’ election, the average percentage of
“For” votes received by these director nominees should fall by about 20.7
percentage points.121 By contrast, if ISS recommends “Withhold” in respect
of a specific director nominee, the percentage of “For” votes received by that
nominee should be about 8.5 percentage points lower than that received by

119. Copland, Larcker & Tayan, supra note 107, at 12. Proxy contests (contested directors’
elections) are rare, which is why other authors looking at voting patterns for proxy contests look at
contests occurring over periods of several years. See, e.g., Brav, Jiang, Li & Pinnington, supra note
107, at 1; Cindy R. Alexander, Mark A. Chen, Duane J. Seppi & Chester S. Spatt, Interim News and
the Role of Proxy Voting Advice, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 4419, 4421 (2010).
120. Ertimur, Ferri & Oesch, supra note 111, at 980–81.
121. Cai, Garner & Walking, supra note 104, at 2401 (holding constant the company-specific
factors included in the regression).
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other director nominees at the same company that received a “For”
recommendation from ISS.122
Studies have taken varying approaches to the “omitted variable” problem
that faces any regression model—that the model misses some outside factor
that, in this context, would explain both ISS’s recommendations and
corresponding voting outcomes. Choi, Fisch & Kahan tried to address this
problem in their study by taking the following steps. First, they controlled for
a series of pre-identified company- and director-specific factors, finding that
the marginal impact of a “Withhold” recommendation was 13.1 percentage
points.123 To control for omitted variables that could influence both voting
outcomes and ISS recommendations, the authors distinguished between
voting patterns of institutional investors (who typically have access to ISS
recommendations) and retail investors (who typically do not).124 Assuming
retail investors do not have access to ISS recommendations, any change in
their voting patterns associated with a “Withhold” recommendation must be
attributable to other factors. After controlling for the influence of these
unknown, outside factors, the authors arrived at a drop of 6.4 percentage
points associated with institutional investors’ reliance on a “Withhold”
recommendation.125
Malenko & Shen, looking at say-on-pay votes occurring over 2010–
2011, took a different approach. Over this period, ISS subjected a company’s
say-on-pay proposal to closer review if the company’s one- and three-year
total shareholder return fell below the median for that firm’s industry.126 The
authors focused on firms falling close to this cut-off: assuming the
distribution of companies falling just below and just above this cut-off is
random, any difference in say-on-pay voting outcomes among these
companies should be attributable to ISS rather than to company-specific
factors.127 The authors found that companies falling within a 10% band below
the threshold were 20% more likely to receive an “Against” recommendation
from ISS, and received 5% fewer “For” votes, than companies falling within
a 10% band above the threshold. 128 Dividing 5% by 20%, the authors
concluded that an “Against” recommendation from ISS can be expected to
reduce the amount of “For” votes a say-on-pay plan receives by 25
percentage points.129
The studies described above, while tending to undermine the blind
reliance narrative, suggest that ISS recommendations have at least some
122. Id. at 2407 (holding constant the other director nominee-specific factors in the regression).
123. Choi, Fisch & Kahan, Myth or Reality?, supra note 105, at 895.
124. The authors note that public disclosure of a proxy advisor recommendation is uncommon
outside of a proxy contest. Id. at 901.
125. Id. at 903.
126. Malenko & Shen, supra note 109, at 3396.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 3404.
129. Id.
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power to move investors’ votes in ways that cannot be explained by other
factors. Choi, Fisch & Kahan, even after their efforts to control both for
factors they identified as relevant to shareholder voting and for unidentified
factors implied from shifts in retail voting behavior, found that a negative ISS
recommendation had a residual influence on voting outcomes.130 Malenko &
Shen’s study focusing on seemingly indistinguishable firms lying on opposite
sides of an ISS-drawn bright line suggests ISS’s influence on voting
outcomes might be especially important for borderline cases.131 I will return
to these findings in Part III.A.
B. THE WEAK VERSION OF THE BLIND RELIANCE NARRATIVE
Even if blind reliance on ISS recommendations is not the norm, it could
reflect the practices of a minority of institutional investors that is sufficiently
large to influence voting results in a material way. Materiality in this context
means more than influencing whether a proposal is successful or
unsuccessful. For example, even if a management proposal (e.g., an
uncontested director nomination or a say-on-pay proposal) succeeds, the
level of support received may be low enough that management opts to make
some form of concession (e.g., by revising its compensation practices, or
exploring a change in CEO) to respond to perceived shareholder
discontent.132
Iliev & Lowry, examining voting patterns by 2,051 mutual funds over
2006–2010, found that over 25% of these funds voted in line with ISS
recommendations over 99% of the time, suggesting that these funds had
adopted a blanket policy of voting in line with ISS recommendations.133 Iliev
& Lowry also found, however, that these funds had characteristics that made
them less likely to be able to materially impact voting outcomes than their
peers: these funds tended to be smaller, invest smaller percentages of their
net assets in any single issuer, and own smaller percentages of issuer equity
than other funds.134 As the authors observed, it likely is rational for a fund
with these characteristics to underinvest in voting—such a fund’s ability to
influence voting outcomes is relatively low, and even if the fund’s votes did

130. Choi, Fisch & Kahan, Myth or Reality?, supra note 105, at 903.
131. Malenko & Shen, supra note 109, at 3404.
132. See, e.g., Cai, Garner & Walkling, supra note 104, at 2390–91; Ertimur, Ferri & Oesch,
supra note 111, at 984–86.
133. Peter Iliev & Michelle Lowry, Are Mutual Funds Active Voters?, 28 REV. FIN. STUD. 446,
451–52, 454 (2015); see also Stephen Choi & Jill E. Fisch, On Beyond CalPERS: Survey Evidence
on the Developing Role of Public Pension Funds in Corporate Governance, 61 VAND. L. REV. 315,
324 (2008) (reporting results of a 2006 survey of U.S. pension funds, including that 20% of
respondents reported delegating complete voting authority to ISS or another organization).
134. Iliev & Lowry, supra note 133, at 455.
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affect voting outcomes, the benefit to the fund likely would be too small to
have any real impact on the fund’s returns.135
A 2013 study by Choi, Fisch & Kahan sought to estimate the influence
of mutual funds that blindly rely on voting recommendations by looking at
these funds’ total assets.136 Taking a sample of 60 mutual fund families, with
equal representation from “large,” “medium,” and “small” fund families, the
authors reviewed these fund families’ votes on uncontested directors’
elections at S&P 1500 companies over 2005–2006.137 After separating these
fund families into “clusters,” those “funds that vote largely in lockstep with
one another”,138 they found that “fund clusters that follow ISS with respect
to more than 99% of all ISS recommendations accounted for a mere 3.04%
of the sample assets.”139
A November 2018 report by the ACCF that looked at voting patterns by
mutual funds as well as other institutional investors uncovered findings that,
at least at first glance, appear more troubling: 82 institutional investors,
representing $1.37 trillion in AUM, voted in line with ISS recommendations
on management and shareholder proposals at least 99% of the time over
2012–2018.140 The 20 largest institutional investors falling into this group
accounted for $1.2 trillion in AUM alone. 141 The report refers to these
investors as “robo-voters,” in light of their seemingly automatic reliance on
ISS recommendations, and cites the magnitude of these investors’ AUM as
evidence of their potential influence over shareholder votes.142 Others appear
to have equated AUM with voting influence as well.143
AUM is not, however, a reliable measure of voting influence. A fund that
invests primarily in fixed income securities (which carry no voting rights) or
135. Id. See also Larcker, McCall & Ormazabal, supra note 112, at 183–84; Ertimur, Ferri &
Oesch, supra note 111, at 981. In addition, that any benefits arising from exercising voting rights
would be shared by all investors, regardless of whether they exercise voting rights prudently,
dampens all investors’ incentives to invest in good governance.
136. Choi, Fisch & Kahan, Who Calls the Shots?, supra note 13.
137. Id. at 45–46.
138. Id. at 48.
139. Id. at 53.
140. Doyle, supra note 6, at 8. Voting information “was pulled from [ISS’s Proxy Insight]
platform as of October 13, 2018 and was filtered to include only those funds that had voted on more
than 100 resolutions. ISS alignment data on the platform reflects all data available for each investor,
which generally dates back as early as July 1, 2012 through the date it was pulled.” Id. at 7 n.5. The
“as of” date of the author’s measure of AUM is unclear, and may be constrained by the currency of
the database or other sources relied on. For example, the private equity firm Blackstone’s total AUM
is reported as $368 billion, but this figure was current only as of March 31, 2017, over a year before
the study was published. Compare id. at 8, with BLACKSTONE, FIRST QUARTER 2017 EARNINGS
MEDIA CALL 2 (Apr. 20, 2017), https://s23.q4cdn.com/714267708/files/doc_events/BLACKSTO
NE-Q1-2017-Media-Call-Transcript.pdf [https://perma.cc/7YKY-9KEV].
141. Doyle, supra note 6, at 8.
142. Id. at 11.
143. See, e.g., Paul Rose, Robovoting and Proxy Vote Disclosure, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP.
GOVERNANCE (Nov. 25, 2019), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/11/25/
robovoting-and-proxy-vote-disclosure/ [https://perma.cc/J4VB-VWYU].
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private equity (not publicly traded) may have substantial AUM but few votes
at public company shareholder meetings. The identities of some of the top
robo-voters listed in the ACCF report, including Blackstone (primarily
known for investing in private equity) and the Virginia Retirement System
and Los Angeles County Employees Retirement Association (both pension
funds, which can be expected to invest most of their assets in fixed income
securities because they need a stockpile of stable, liquid assets to maintain
regular payments to retirees), leads one to expect that these entities’ U.S.
public equity holdings would represent only a small portion of their AUM.
Because the ACCF lists the 20 largest robo-voters identified in its
research (ordered by AUM),144 it is possible to gain a rough picture of these
investors’ possible impact on U.S. shareholder meetings by looking at their
public filings. Most of these institutional investors file quarterly totals of their
holdings of U.S. public equities and certain other securities with the SEC on
Form 13F (available online via the SEC’s Electronic Data Gathering and
Retrieval system (EDGAR)), while some others disclose information about
their assets in their annual reports. The table below draws from this data,
which are presented as of December 31, 2017, unless noted otherwise.
Table 2: Holdings of Top 2 Institutional Investors that Vote in
Line with ISS at least
of the Time145
Investor

Blackstone Group
AQR Capital Management LLC
United Services Automobile Association
Arrowstreet Capital
Virginia Retirement System
Los Angeles County Employees
Retirement Association(a)
Baring Asset Management / Barings LLC
Numeric Investors, LLC

AUM as stated
by ACCF
millions

Holdings reported on
Form 13F or other
source as noted
millions

368,000
224,000
137,000
69,952
67,804

24,564
108,193
36,532
42,189
8,467

56,000

8,198

40,000
39,800

7,689
15,086

144. Doyle, supra note 6, at 8.
145. Form 13F holdings include assets over which the manager shares investment discretion with
another manager. Holdings reported on Form 13F are available on EDGAR. Holdings attributed to
managers that do not file Form 13F were retrieved from the following sources: L.A. CNTY. EMPL
RET. ASS’N, IT ALL ADDS UP: 2018 ANNUAL REPORT 88, 90 (2018), https://www.lacera.com/
archives/archivesInvestments/annual_report_2018/cafr.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TUB7-4ZG8];
ALAMEDA CNTY. EMPL. RET. ASS’N, BUILDING UP YOUR FUTURE: COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL
FINANCIAL REPORT FOR THE YEAR ENDED DECEMBER 31, 2017 45 (2018), https://www.acera.org/
sites/main/files/file-attachments/2018.06.29_2017_cafr_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/MQ73-U9PG];
PENSIONSKASSE SBB, GESCHÄFTSBERICHT 2017 29 (2018), https://spkr.ch/de/file_upload/9910d3
e523e6b976b37c53319719c471.pdf [https://perma.cc/FA46-VKPL].
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PanAgora Asset Management, Inc.

38,400

26,651

First Trust Portfolios Canada
ProShare Advisors LLC

28,000
23,900

28,000(b)
14,416

Kentucky Teachers’ Retirement System
Stone Ridge Asset Management

16,576
16,285

8,513
1,516

Pensionskasse SBB(a), (c)

16,280

1,750

13,500
13,275

5,789

8,803

2,636

6,966

1,475

6,500
5,725
1 1 6 766

7,183
3,895
352 741

(d)

Euclid Advisors LLC
Rafferty Asset Management, LLC
Driehaus Capital Management LLC
Alameda County Employees’ Retirement
Association(a)
DSM Capital Partners LLC
Weiss Multi-Strategy Advisers LLC
Total
a)

b)

c)

d)

Information drawn from annual report, as the entity does not file on Form 13F.
For the Los Angeles County Employees Retirement Association, the figure
presented is the average of the totals it reported as of June 30, 2017, and June
30, 2018 (it reports figures annually as of June 30, the end of its fiscal year).
The Canadian securities filings (available at www.sedar.com) of the funds
managed by First Trust’s Canadian portfolio manager (FT Portfolios Canada
Co.) suggest this entity’s AUM is far smaller than the figure obtained by the
ACCF. It is possible that this figure includes some portion of the ETF assets
managed by the entity’s U.S. affiliate, First Trust Advisors L.P. Out of caution,
the ACCF’s AUM figure has been left in place.
As this entity does not separately disclose its holdings of U.S. public equities,
its reported holdings of public equities in developed markets (outside
Switzerland) are reflected in this table instead. Figure converted from Swiss
francs to U.S. dollars using the exchange rate in effect as of December 31, 2017
(1 CHF = 1.0261 USD).
The entity discontinued filing on Form 13F. Its final Form 13F filing (for Q3
2016) disclosed U.S. public equity holdings of $0.

The $352.7 billion total reflected in the table above is less than one-third
of the nearly $1.2 trillion total reached using the AUM figures published by
the ACCF, and amounts to only 1.2% of U.S. public market capitalization as
of year-end 2017.146 In respect of the other robo-voters too small to be named
in the ACCF report, if we were to adopt the extreme assumption that all of
these robo-voters’ AUM represented investments in U.S. public equities, this
would only get us to a total of $528 billion, or approximately 1.7% of U.S.

146. See supra note 95.
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public market capitalization—a percentage that seems unlikely to have a
material influence on shareholder voting outcomes.
This figure comes with caveats. First, institutional investors’ Form 13F
filings frequently contain errors. 147 But because evidence suggests these
errors are not biased in any particular direction,148 it seems reasonable to
expect that over- and understatements of investors’ holdings would tend to
cancel each other out. To the extent errors in investors’ Form 13F disclosures
result in an understatement of their equity holdings, a second problem with
these disclosures likely counteract this result: the types of securities required
to be disclosed on Form 13F extend beyond stock in U.S. public companies.
Form 13F also requires disclosure of holdings of certain equity options and
warrants, closed-end investment companies, and U.S.-listed stocks of nonU.S. issuers.149 To the extent such holdings are reflected in the table above,
this results in an overstatement of these investors’ voting power. Some
reassurance in this estimate is gained from it being intuitive that investors
that blindly rely on ISS recommendations would tend to have little influence
on voting outcomes—these investors would blindly rely on ISS
recommendations precisely because they know their holdings are too
insignificant for them to have any realistic probability of affecting the
shareholder vote. If robo-voters were as influential as the proponents of the
blind reliance narrative suggest, they presumably would have an incentive to
cast informed votes instead of blindly relying on a proxy advisor.150
In summary, proponents of the weak version of the blind reliance
narrative are right to note that a minority of institutional investors appear to
be blindly relying on ISS recommendations, based on their voting behavior.
But they are wrong to point to these investors’ AUM as evidence that these
investors could have a material influence on a shareholder vote. Many types
of funds, including pension funds and funds that advertise themselves as
having primary expertise in an asset class other than public equities, may
have substantial AUM but relatively small public equity holdings. Form 13F
filings and other disclosures of institutional investors presumed to be robovoters illustrate the problems with conflating AUM and U.S. public equity
holdings, and suggest that robo-voters are unlikely to be material to the
outcomes of shareholder votes at U.S. public companies.
C. THE PROXY ADVISORS AS RESEARCH PROVIDERS NARRATIVE
The discussion in Parts II.A and II.B lends some support to the proxy
advisors as research providers narrative. It drew from institutional investors’
147. Anne Anderson & Paul Brockman, An Examination of 13F Filings, 41 J. FIN. RES. 295, 299
(2018).
148. Id. at 322–23.
149. SEC, Frequently Asked Questions About Form 13F (Feb. 24, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/
divisions/investment/13ffaq.htm [https://perma.cc/3L9G-SQM7].
150. See supra notes 133–139 and accompanying text.
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voting patterns to suggest that most, though not all, institutional investors
disagree with their proxy advisors on some matters. These voting patterns
also suggest that institutional investors seem to take different views on
different ISS recommendations, depending on the surrounding
circumstances. However, there is reason to doubt that this narrative reflects
institutional investors’ behavior on all, or even most, votes.
First, surveys and other data indicate that smaller institutional investors
face significant challenges exercising their voting rights, and that they rely
heavily on proxy advisors’ recommendations in exercising these rights. In
one survey of U.S. pension funds, about half of respondents reported
delegating full voting authority to a proxy advisor, to be exercised in
accordance either with the proxy advisor’s policies or custom policies set by
the investor.151 In neither case can the proxy advisor’s role be cast as that of
mere research provider. The investor does not leave itself discretion to make
a different voting decision based on the information collected by the proxy
advisor, or to receive additional information from the issuer or another party
that might lead it to disagree with the proxy advisor’s recommendation. A
2018 report by BlackRock stated that while some institutional investors
“have their own in-house proxy voting and stewardship functions that use the
research from proxy advisory firms as an input into their investment
stewardship process, … others rely more heavily or even exclusively on the
recommendations of proxy advisors for deciding how to vote.”152 The report
added that “given the large number of votes that take place during proxy
season each year, many investors rely heavily on the recommendations of
proxy advisors to determine their votes, as they may not have the resources
to individually analyze each proposal in detail.”153 The discussion on robovoting in Part II.B is consistent with the notion that some institutional
investors, albeit representing a small minority of U.S. public equity holdings,
appear to vote in line with proxy advisor recommendations unquestioningly.
Second, and more importantly, there is reason to doubt that even midsize and larger institutional investors would separately scrutinize every
proposal that comes up for a vote. Exercising voting rights is far from a
costless exercise, and one would expect institutional investors to try to
minimize costs. Hiring a proxy advisor to play the role of research provider
may go some of the way toward reducing the costs of voting, but even then,
the task of making fully informed voting decisions may be overwhelming.
To make a fully informed voting decision, an institutional investor
presumably would need to review its proxy advisor’s report, understand and
151. Choi & Fisch, supra note 133, at 324.
152. BARBARA NOVICK, MICHELLE EDKINS, TOM CLARK & ALEXIS ROSENBLUM, BLACKROCK,
THE INVESTMENT STEWARDSHIP ECOSYSTEM 5–6 (2018), https://www.blackrock.com/
corporate/literature/whitepaper/viewpoint-investment-stewardship-ecosystem-july-2018.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DZQ2-A7NY].
153. Id.
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evaluate the material assumptions and analyses underlying the report (e.g.,
selection of compensation peer groups, calculation of financial and other
metrics), and review background information in management’s proxy
statement as well as additional information from management and third
parties that may be developed in response to the proxy advisor’s report. The
challenge of finding staff to undertake this work is compounded by U.S.
public companies’ tendency to schedule their shareholder meetings within
the same four-month proxy season, such that institutional investors are
required to make the vast majority of their annual voting decisions within a
compressed timespan.154 One reasonably would expect institutional investors
to look for shortcuts.
While these shortcuts are not apparent when one focuses on institutional
investors’ responses to negative proxy advisor recommendations, shifting
focus to positive proxy advisor recommendations offers some clues. Eight of
the studies summarized in Table 1 report the average level of support a
management proposal received when ISS issued a recommendation to vote
for that proposal.
Table 3: Average Levels of Support for Management Proposals
Endorsed by ISS155
Authors Year

Time Period

Uncontested
directors’
elections

Cai, Garner & Walkling (2009)
Choi, Fisch & Kahan (2010)
Ertimur, Ferri & Oesch (2018)
Copland, Larcker & Tayan (2018)

2003–2005
2005–2006
2003–2010
2017

Average Level of
Support with
Positive ISS
Recommendation
96.2%
96.4%
96.4%
97.2%

Say-on-pay

Thomas, Palmiter & Cotter (2012)
Malenko & Shen (2016)
Cotter, Palmiter & Thomas (2013)
Ertimur, Ferri & Oesch (2013)
Copland, Larcker & Tayan (2018)
Copland, Larcker & Tayan (2018)

2003–2010
2010–2011
2011
2011
2017
2017

92.4%
93.2%
92.6%
93.6%
95.3%
92.7%

Proposal
Type

Equity plans

All of the studies listed above reported average levels of support of 92%
or higher. All three studies that looked at uncontested directors’ elections

154. See George W. Dent, Jr., A Defense of Proxy Advisors, 2014 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1287, 1312
(2014).
155. Data drawn from: Cai, Garner & Walkling, supra note 104, at 2403; Choi, Fisch & Kahan,
Myth or Reality?, supra note 105, at 907; Copland, Larcker & Tayan, supra note 107, at 12; Thomas,
Palmiter & Cotter, supra note 108, at 1245; Malenko & Shen, supra note 109, at 3403; Cotter,
Palmiter & Thomas, supra note 110, at 983; Ertimur, Ferri & Oesch, supra note 111, at 973.
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reported average levels of support above 96%. To the extent the studies listed
in the table above looked at other proxy advisors’ recommendations as well
as ISS recommendations, they found that average levels of support tended to
be slightly higher when both ISS and another firm issued positive
recommendations: 97.0% (up 0.6%) in the case of the Choi, Fisch & Kahan
study;156 and 97.5% (up 0.3%) (uncontested directors’ elections), 96.4% (up
0.9%) (say-on-pay), and 93.2% (up 0.5%) (equity plans) in the case of the
Copland, Larcker & Tayan study (which looked exclusively at ISS and Glass
Lewis recommendations).157
If shareholder voting with the assistance of a proxy advisor were a “oneshot game” (i.e., an institutional investor hires a proxy advisor to support its
voting over only a single proxy season), it might be rational for the investor
to scrutinize every recommendation it receives from its proxy advisor before
voting, as it might not feel it has a sufficient basis for trusting that the proxy
advisor’s recommendations will align with its preferences. 158 But
institutional investors and their proxy advisors are in fact in a “repeat
game”—institutional investors work with the same proxy advisors, year after
year, over multiple proxy seasons, giving them opportunities to adapt their
behavior over time in welfare-maximizing ways.159 A rational investor that
observes that it always, or almost always, agrees with its proxy advisor’s
recommendations when those recommendations fall into a given category
(e.g., positive recommendations on management proposals) would not
continue incurring costs by undertaking a redundant vote-by-vote review of
these recommendations. They would look for shortcuts, like one or more of
the following: (i) relying on the proxy advisor’s bottom-line
recommendations without expending the costs involved in looking behind
these recommendations, (ii) customizing its proxy voting policies to address
fringe areas where the investor consistently disagrees with its proxy advisor,
and (iii) implementing low-cost quality controls (e.g., reviewing a random
sample of the proxy advisor’s voting recommendations) to provide assurance
that the proxy advisor’s analyses remain accurate and reflective of the
investor’s preferences. The proxy advisor, in turn, has an incentive to
continue producing recommendations of equivalent quality so that it can keep
the investor’s business. What is more, such an approach would be in full
accord with SEC rules and guidance as they existed prior to the SEC’s 2019–
2020 package of reforms.

156. Choi, Fisch & Kahan, Myth or Reality?, supra note 105, at 908.
157. Copland, Larcker & Tayan, supra note 107, at 12.
158. See Robert Axelrod & William D. Hamilton, The Evolution of Cooperation, 211 SCIENCE
1390, 1391 (1981); Robert D. Cooter, Against Legal Centrism, 81 CAL. L. REV. 417, 422–23 (1993)
(reviewing ROBERT ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES
(1991)).
159. Axelrod & Hamilton, supra note 158, at 1391; Cooter, supra note 158, at 422–23.
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In summary, there is reason to doubt that the research provider narrative
reflects institutional investors’ behavior all or even most of the time. The
near-unanimous support management proposals tend to receive when those
proposals are endorsed by ISS suggests that investors overwhelmingly agree
with each other and with ISS when it comes to this category of proposals,
year after year. There would seem to be little point in an institutional
investor’s fully scrutinizing recommendations that it knows it is highly likely
(or perhaps almost certain) to agree with. Instead, one would expect the
investor to take shortcuts allowing it to rely on its proxy advisor’s
recommendations without undertaking separate analysis.
III. TOWARD A MORE NUANCED ACCOUNT OF PROXY
ADVISOR INFLUENCE
I argue that the mainstream accounts of proxy advisors’ influence on
voting outcomes fall short because they miss a central role that proxy
advisors appear to play in most institutional investors’ decision-making
processes: that of issue spotter. 160 This role comprises helping investors
distinguish controversial matters requiring independent analysis from noncontroversial matters that do not require much (or perhaps any) vote-specific
analysis beyond that completed by the proxy advisor, thus serving to narrow
the universe of voting decisions that require these investors’ active attention.
On this account, in respect of most types of matters, institutional investors
will consider a vote to be controversial if the proxy advisor’s
recommendation diverges from that of management, and non-controversial if
the proxy advisor’s recommendation aligns with that of management.
To the extent institutional investors are using proxy advisors as issue
spotters, proxy advisors’ recommendations have the power to move
shareholder votes, but the nature of this power depends on the direction of
the recommendation. Recommendations that align with those of management
have the effect of taking matters off institutional investors’ agendas, all but
assuring that a vote will unfold as management had hoped.
Recommendations that diverge from those of management carry much less
power, as they tend to serve as a signal only that an investor should look at
the information underlying the proxy advisor’s recommendation as well as
relevant outside sources before casting its votes. On this account, analyses
pointing to proxy advisors’ influence over shareholder voting outcomes are
primarily capturing proxy advisors’ power to give management a pass by
issuing recommendations supportive of management, rather than their power
to force a negative outcome for management by issuing recommendations
160. I do not argue that all institutional investors use proxy advisors as issue spotters (the robovoters discussed in Part II.B, supra, clearly do not), or that proxy advisors serve only as issue
spotters (for example, their research plays a separate role in informing investors’ decisions on
controversial matters). I argue only that issue-spotting is a role that proxy advisors appear to play
in most institutional investors’ processes for making voting decisions.
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that oppose those of management. This point is perhaps clearer if one
analogizes it to the court system: appeals of trial judgments often succeed,
but this is not evidence that the losing party at trial has the power to dictate
how appellate courts decide their cases. The best they can do is give the
winning party a pass by declining to appeal and thus excluding their matter
from the appellate court’s attention.
Adopting a more nuanced account of proxy advisors’ influence that
incorporates their role as issue spotters allows us to reconcile the dueling
empirical claims made by proponents of the blind reliance and research
provider narratives. We can accept as true both the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce’s assertion that institutional investors typically vote in line with
ISS recommendations, by also keeping in mind that the vast majority of ISS
recommendations align with those of management. At the same time, we also
can accept the Council of Institutional Investors’ assertion that proxy
advisors merely supplement the resources institutional investors spend inhouse on making voting decisions, by adding the caveat that these in-house
resources are focused on those matters the investor deems to be most worthy
of its attention based on the direction of its proxy advisor’s
recommendation.161
This Part aims to clarify the scope of this role by looking at how it might
work in the context of different types of proposals. In particular, it argues that
proxy advisors appear likely to play an issue-spotting role with respect to the
numerous and often uncontroversial ordinary course management and
shareholder proposals (where corporate control is not in issue). However, in
proxy contests (contested directors’ elections), institutional investors have
little need of an issue spotter because these matters are inherently
controversial given that corporate control is at issue. For these matters,
institutional investors are likely to value proxy advisors exclusively as
research providers.
A. ORDINARY COURSE MANAGEMENT PROPOSALS
The bulk of the empirical evidence described above focuses on
management proposals on ordinary course matters, such as proposals to elect
directors nominated by management in uncontested elections, say-on-pay
proposals, and proposals to approve new equity compensation plans.
Shareholders view most of these proposals as uncontroversial, as evidenced
by the high levels of support these proposals receive on average.162 But at the
same time, they know that a minority of these proposals will be controversial.
161. U.S. Chamber of Commerce, supra note 3, at 8; CII Letter, supra note 7, at 6.
162. BROADRIDGE & PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 96, at 5–6; GINA LAURIERO,
MIMS MAYNARD ZABRISKIE & JEFFREY LETALIEN, MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP, 2020
PROXY SEASON: A RECAP OF 2019 AND TRENDS TO WATCH (2020) 7, https://www.morganlewis
.com/-/media/files/publication/presentation/webinar/2020/public-company-academy/2020-proxyseason-a-recap-of-2019-and-trends-to-watch.pdf [https://perma.cc/VAF2-2VGK].
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When a proxy advisor recommends voting in favor of an ordinary course
management proposal, this serves as a signal that the proposal is
uncontroversial and that investors should vote in line with management’s
(and the proxy advisor’s) recommendation without spending too much time
researching the basis for the recommendation. Institutional investors’
reflexive support for proposals falling into this category is evidenced by the
studies listed in Table 3, each of which found average support for ISSendorsed management proposals in excess of 90%, despite covering varying
types of proposals over varying time periods. Factors that might explain why
ISS-endorsed management proposals do not receive even higher support on
average include (i) small differences in institutional investors’ proxy voting
policies which may lead them to occasionally vote against an ISS-endorsed
proposal, (ii) instances where another proxy advisor recommends voting
against an ISS-endorsed proposal, and one or more of that proxy advisor’s
clients decide to side with this recommendation rather than that of ISS and
(iii) dissenting votes cast by retail investors and institutional investors that
are not ISS clients.
When a proxy advisor recommends voting against a management
proposal, institutional investors appear to view this as a signal that the vote
is controversial and should be set aside for closer analysis. Different investors
may reach different decisions on these votes, as reflected in their tendency
not to vote en masse against management in response to a negative ISS
recommendation. These investors could rely on a variety of bases for
reaching diverging voting decisions on the same proposal. Some investors
with larger stakes in a company may have been consulted by management on
the matter up for vote beforehand (management, based on its understanding
of proxy advisors’ policies, may have anticipated that the matter would be
controversial), 163 and vote in line with management because they were
persuaded by the case previously made by management. Alternatively, large
investors might exercise effective control over a company and thus have
overseen the formulation of the proposals up for vote. Other investors might
wait for management to file supplemental proxy materials in response to the
proxy advisor’s recommendation and take these materials into account before
voting, while others might be inclined to give management the benefit of the
doubt if the company has been generating adequate returns.164
163. See Ertimur, Ferri & Oesch, supra note 111, at 969 (“for most items on the ballot, [proxy
advisors’] recommendations are largely anticipated and there is limited incremental information in
[proxy advisor] reports”).
164. See, e.g., Fisch, Palia & Davidoff Solomon, supra note 113, at 101 (finding, based on sayon-pay voting outcomes, that “shareholders do not appear to care about executive compensation
unless an issuer is performing badly”). Others suggest deference to management could reflect more
self-interested motives. For example, more deference could pay dividends to a mutual fund sponsor
if it means company managers are more inclined to include that sponsor’s mutual funds as an
investing option for company employees’ retirement plans. See Sean J. Griffith & Dorothy S. Lund,
Conflicted Mutual Fund Voting in Corporate Law, 99 B.U. L. REV. 1151, 1176–82 (2019).
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Viewing proxy advisors as issue spotters helps resolve a tension between
the findings of Choi, Fisch & Kahan and those of Malenko & Shen. Choi,
Fisch & Kahan look at an entire universe of uncontested directors’ elections
and find that ISS’s influence on voting outcomes could be as low as 6.4
percentage points, 165 whereas Malenko & Shen, focusing on companies
sitting along a borderline ISS used to set companies aside for closer review,
found that ISS’s influence likely is around 25 percentage points.166 If ISS’s
influence stems from its ability to focus institutional investors on some
proposals and not others, this influence should appear strongest close to any
cut-off ISS uses when developing its recommendations. Those companies on
the right side of ISS’s cut-off are well-placed to escape investor scrutiny and
receive overwhelming support on the management proposals up for vote.
Those on the wrong side of the cut-off will face investor scrutiny, with
different investors reaching different verdicts based on their view of
management’s track record and the merits of the relevant proposals. When
one looks at the entire universe of recommendations made by a proxy
advisor, however, these borderline cases should tend to be overwhelmed by
clearer cases for which factors outside of the particulars of the proxy
advisor’s process for reaching recommendations provide ready explanations
for differences in voting outcomes. This would lead one to reach a lower
estimate of the marginal impact of a proxy advisor recommendation.
B. ORDINARY COURSE SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS
Proposals introduced by shareholders can cover matters as wide-ranging
as corporate governance (e.g., a proposal to separate the role of board chair
from that of CEO), labor rights, and environmental sustainability. These
proposals are almost always opposed by management and tend to have a low
probability of succeeding.167 In this context, a proxy advisor’s role may be to
help investors separate those shareholder proposals that merit closer attention
from those that ought to be rejected out of hand.
Thomas, Palmiter & Cotter reached results broadly consistent with this
account. Shareholder proposals on executive pay opposed by both
management and ISS received 11% support on average, compared to 39.9%
for proposals endorsed by ISS and opposed by management, a difference of
28.8%. 168 A 2012 report by the Manhattan Institute reviewed ISS
165. Choi, Fisch & Kahan, Myth or Reality?, supra note 105, at 903.
166. Malenko & Shen, supra note 109, at 3404.
167. JAMES R. COPLAND, YEVGENIY FEYMAN & MARGARET O’KEEFE, PROXY MONITOR 2012:
A REPORT ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM (2012) 18, https://www.
proxymonitor.org/pdf/pmr_04.pdf [https://perma.cc/GZ6M-7EM4]; Thomas, Palmiter & Cotter,
supra note 108, at 1245.
168. Thomas, Palmiter & Cotter, supra note 108, at 1245. These findings are distinct from the
authors’ findings with respect to management-presented say-on-pay proposals, which are described
in Table 1. Note that the authors report levels of support for eight types of executive pay shareholder
proposals; the figures reported above are a weighted average of this data.
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recommendations and voting outcomes with respect to shareholder proposals
introduced at Fortune 200 companies from 2006 through 2012, finding that
positive ISS recommendations are associated with a 15 percentage point
boost in shareholder support on average.169 The report also found that the gap
between a proposal’s likelihood of success and its likelihood of receiving an
ISS endorsement tended to vary widely depending on its subject matter. For
example, while ISS endorsed 70% of proposals on political spending and
lobbying, only 1% received majority support. By contrast, ISS endorsed 97%
of board declassification proposals and 84% received majority support.170
This data appears consistent with the notion that institutional investors are
reviewing and exercising independent judgment on ISS recommendations
that differ from those of management.
The report suggests, however, that ISS may not be doing an effective job
of winnowing down voting decisions for institutional investors. While ISS
endorsed over 63% of all shareholder proposals covered by the study, only
8% of shareholder proposals received majority support. 171 The report
speculated that ISS’s general policies on shareholder proposals may be
calibrated to the preferences of a subset of its clients from which it generates
significant revenues, “social investment vehicles and labor-union pension
funds,” rather than to the preferences of its client base as a whole,172 leading
it to flag proposals that most of its clients generally would not consider
supporting. Another possibility is that ISS was spotting issues correctly, and
that the bulk of its clients simply had not caught up with ISS’s thinking in
this area. While proposals on environmental and social matters might have
been regarded as fringe issues at the time the report was published, the strong
expressions of support for more corporate action on climate change and
human rights expressed by major institutional investors such as BlackRock
and Vanguard leave one with the impression that ISS was ahead of the
curve,173 notwithstanding the Trump-era DOL’s comments on the matter in
its 2020 rulemaking.174 Even if ISS’s general policies in this area were not
well-tailored to its clients’ objectives, these clients could have responded by
customizing their voting policies so that ISS’s issue-spotting activities more
closely align with their views on which shareholder proposals merit attention.

169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

Copland, Feyman & O’Keefe, supra note 167, at 3.
Id. at 23.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 23.
See, e.g., Peter Reali & Anthony Garcia, Nuveen, LLC, Proxy Season Rising Demand for
Board Oversight of ESG, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Sept. 11, 2019),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/09/11/proxy-season-rising-demand-for-board-oversight-ofesg/ [https://perma.cc/M4DW-9GMN]. See also Keith Johnson, Cynthia Williams & Ruth Aguilera,
Proxy Voting Reform: What is on the Agenda, What is Not on the Agenda, and Why it Matters for
Asset Owners, 99 B.U. L. REV. 1347, 1353–55 (2019).
174. DOL Proposed Rules, supra note 17, at 55,223.
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If this is the case, ISS’s efficacy at spotting issues for its clients may be better
than the statistics highlighted in the report indicate.
C. PROXY CONTESTS
Institutional investors need no assistance spotting issues in proxy
contests. Contested directors’ elections come with high stakes for
shareholders, as the victory of a dissident slate of director nominees can mean
significant changes in a company’s strategy, potentially resulting in a
company merger or breakup.175 All parties to the contest can be expected to
wage campaigns for shareholder support, such that investors should have
access to substantial information on the issues at the center of the contest.176
Because proxy contests are relatively rare, ranging at about 50 per year in the
United States over 2016–2019 in contrast to the thousands of say-on-pay
resolutions and uncontested director nominations one sees annually, 177
institutional investors should for the most part be able to afford to
independently analyze and make voting decisions when such a contest arises
at a company in its investment portfolio.
In this context, proxy advisors may serve exclusively as research
providers, with their reports helping institutional investors sift through the
information underlying the competing narratives promoted by the
management and dissident slates of director nominees to reach a voting
decision. The study by Brav, Jiang, Li & Pinnington, 178 which examines
mutual fund voting in proxy contests at U.S. companies between 2008 and
2015, suggests a level of heterogeneity in mutual fund voting that seems to
reflect their reaching different, independent judgments regardless of ISS’s
bottom line recommendation. The authors found that, on average, dissidents
with ISS support received 57.5% of mutual funds’ votes, compared with
17.8% in the case of dissidents without ISS support (a difference of about
40%).179 These averages do not reflect the kind of overwhelming average
levels of support that would suggest blind reliance on the proxy advisor’s
bottom-line recommendation. But the size of the voting swing, together with
the authors’ finding that an endorsement from ISS increased a dissident’s
chance of victory by 35%,180 suggests that mutual funds (and likely other
investors) tend to give ISS recommendations serious weight in making voting
decisions.
175. See, e.g., 2018 Review of Shareholder Activism, LAZARD, 3–5 (2019), https://www.lazard.
com/media/450805/lazards-2018-review-of-shareholder-activism.pdf [https://perma.cc/V4CY-GG
79] (reporting outcomes of various proxy contests in 2018).
176. Katherine W. Kelley, Kullman: Tactics for Winning a Proxy Fight, NACD BOARDTALK
(Oct. 19, 2017), https://blog.nacdonline.org/posts/how-to-win-a-proxy-fight [https://perma.cc/6N
GS-93MP].
177. See Copland, Larcker & Tayan, supra note 107, at 12.
178. Brav, Jiang, Li & Pinnington, supra note 116.
179. Id. (manuscript at 17).
180. Id. (manuscript at 4).
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Another study, by Alexander, Chen, Seppi & Spatt, looked at the price
impact of ISS recommendations on proxy contests over 1992–2005 to try and
understand how investors view these recommendations.181 The authors found
that an ISS endorsement of a dissident slate was followed by an increase in
the company’s stock price, attributable to two factors: (i) investors’
perception that the dissident’s chance of winning is higher, 182 and
(ii) increased confidence that the dissidents, if victorious, will be able to
increase the company’s value.183 The authors reasoned that the quality of a
dissident and its plans for the company may be difficult for investors to
assess, such that they would place value on a “certification” of that dissident
by ISS.184
In summary, investors have little need for an issue spotter when it comes
to proxy contests because all proxy contests raise significant issues requiring
their attention. Rather, it appears investors tend to use proxy advisors as a
source (but by no means their sole source) of information and guidance, with
their recommendations providing indicators not only of a dissident’s chances
of success but of the underlying quality of the dissident and its plans for the
company.
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR PROXY ADVISOR REGULATION
The SEC’s package of proxy advisor reforms aim to address at least three
different, though overlapping, failure scenarios for the delivery of proxy
advice: (i) the proxy advisor uses low-quality standards for developing its
recommendations, defined here as standards that fail to serve their intended
goals even if they are correctly applied; (ii) the proxy advisor delivers lowquality recommendations, defined here as recommendations that fail to
reflect its standards (e.g., as a result of bias or factual or analytical errors);
and (iii) the proxy advisor’s clients make low-quality voting decisions
(whether due to defects in the proxy advisor’s advice or other factors). Critics
of the SEC’s reforms point to a fourth possibility that excessive regulation
will reduce the supply of and demand for proxy advice, in turn making it
more difficult for shareholders to cast informed votes and engage in
meaningful oversight of public company managers.185

181. Alexander, Chen, Seppi & Spatt, supra note 119. Unlike recommendations on ordinary
course management and shareholder proposals, ISS recommendations on proxy contests typically
are made public, often by the party that received ISS’s endorsement. Id. at 4424.
182. The authors find that an ISS endorsement increased a dissident’s probability of success by
between 14% and 30%. Id. at 4422. This estimate is lower than that reached by Brav, Jiang, Li &
Pinnington, likely reflecting the authors’ older sample of contests (proxy advisors’ client bases grew
significantly over the 1990s and early 2000s). See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note
94, at 13.
183. Alexander, Chen, Seppi & Spatt, supra note 119, at 4452.
184. Id. at 4451.
185. See, e.g., Dent, supra note 154, at 1304–06; Cappucci, supra note 56, at 610–11.
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After briefly reviewing the possible effects of more burdensome proxy
advisor regulation, this Part examines the implications that taking proxy
advisors’ role as issue spotters into account may have for different proposals
to address the three failure scenarios listed above. In respect to the first
scenario, it turns on its head a frequent criticism of proxy advisors’ standards,
reflected in the SEC’s reforms—that their one-size-fits-all approach to
corporate governance fails to account for the circumstances of particular
issuers and thus results in too many recommendations to vote in opposition
to management. To the extent negative recommendations serve only to focus
investors’ attention, erring on the side of providing such recommendations is
not objectionable. The real problem may be that proxy advisors’ standards
result in too few negative recommendations. Issuers could exploit
weaknesses in these standards to secure positive recommendations despite
problematic practices, thus increasing the likelihood that these practices will
escape investors’ notice. The SEC’s reforms do not address this problem. As
part of the review of proxy advisor regulation expected to be conducted under
the Biden Administration,186 it could be worthwhile for the SEC to explore
mitigating this problem through guidance that encourages investment
advisers to review records of their past votes to identify potential weaknesses
in their proxy advisor’s voting standards and work with the proxy advisor to
resolve them. The DOL could provide parallel guidance to those investment
fiduciaries under its oversight.
Turning to the second scenario, incorporating an understanding of proxy
advisors’ role as issue spotters points toward a more focused approach to
regulating the presentation and delivery of proxy advisor recommendations,
and any response from the issuer, than that adopted by the SEC. The SEC’s
reforms should have focused on helping institutional investors access new
signals about the quality of these recommendations of which they would not
otherwise have been aware. Instead, the reforms impose a variety of new, at
times burdensome requirements that appear to signal problems that investors
are already aware of and have adapted to.
For the third scenario, this account suggests that, instead of issuing
guidance that could be viewed as imposing new procedural hurdles to voting
on the vast majority of investors that appear not to blindly rely on their proxy
advisors’ recommendations, the SEC should focus its attention on the small
minority of investors that cast their votes in lockstep with proxy advisor
recommendations. The SEC would be right to question whether this small
minority is in fact exercising its voting rights prudently, or whether these
investors are simply imposing unnecessary costs on its clients in an effort to
shield themselves from liability under current rules and guidance. A targeted
response to this problem could include guidance reiterating that investment
advisers can agree with their clients not to exercise voting rights when they
186. Coffee, supra note 15.
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believe the costs of doing so likely will exceed the benefits, and adding that
in assessing these costs investment advisers should consider the cost of
independently reviewing proxy advisor recommendations on controversial
matters.
A. PREFACE: POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF MORE BURDENSOME
REGULATION
As illustrated in Part I, the proxy advisors’ growth likely was not a result
of market forces alone. Regulation likely helped generate demand for proxy
advisors’ services and fostered growth in the supply of these services.
Regulation also could impose costs that have the opposite effects, casting a
shadow over any proposal aimed at addressing proxy advisors’ perceived
failings. On the supply side, these costs are salient because proxy advisors do
not appear well-placed to absorb these costs on their own and, accordingly,
it is likely that these costs would cascade to institutional investors, issuers
(particularly smaller issuers), and retail investors. On ISS’s and Glass
Lewis’s ability to absorb costs, two points are relevant: (i) despite their
dominance of the proxy advisory market, they do not reap monopoly-like
profits, 187 and (ii) the already massive and still-growing volume of
management and shareholder proposals requiring recommendations each
year, largely “crammed into a four-month proxy season,” only makes proxy
advisors’ compliance challenges more daunting. 188 While proxy advisors
could try to pass higher costs on to their clients, small and mid-size
institutional investors may be unwilling to pay them. SLB 20 already notes
that there is nothing preventing investment advisers from agreeing with their
clients not to exercise voting rights if the costs of exercising these rights
exceed the expected benefits.189 As such, a rational response to higher prices
may be to stop using proxy advisors altogether (and most likely either stop
voting or adopt a blanket policy of always voting in line with management
recommendations).
If proxy advisors cannot pass on the costs of more burdensome regulation
through higher prices, they could try to do so through at least two other
means. First, by providing lower-quality research and advice. For example,
if proxy advisors were required to clear their recommendations through
management as had been contemplated under the Proposed Rules,190 their
path of least resistance would have been to abandon the notion of providing
objective advice and instead provide advice favorable to management. As
one market participant has observed, if proxy advisors “believe that every
disagreement over a subjective determination like a say‐on‐pay vote is likely
187. Dent, supra note 154, at 1308.
188. Proxy Advisory Business: Apotheosis or Apogee?, LATHAM & WATKINS LLP (Mar. 2011),
https://www.lw.com/upload/pubContent/_pdf/pub4042_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/5FSP-52NA].
189. SLB 20, supra note 60, at Question 2.
190. Proposed Rules, supra note 67, at 66530.
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to lead to a messy confrontation with management, they may be less inclined
to issue negative advice.”191 Second, proxy advisors could reduce the number
of companies they cover. This probably would mean limiting their coverage
to large companies, in which the largest number of their clients invest.
Institutional investors might divest from smaller companies if these
companies no longer are covered by proxy advisors, leaving these investors’
beneficiaries less diversified and making it even more difficult for emerging
companies to raise capital in the public markets.192
More burdensome regulation also may discourage others from providing
proxy advice, further impairing competition in this sector. While existing
barriers to entry already make it unlikely that another business similar to ISS
will emerge, one could foresee, for example, non-profit organizations
providing proxy advice on specific issues of interest (e.g., shareholder
proposals on environmental, social and governance matters) in conjunction
with more general advocacy on these issues.193 One also could foresee groups
of institutional investors establishing co-operatives to pool their resources for
overseeing portfolio companies.194 Could more burdensome regulation have
a chilling effect on these kinds of activities? At a minimum, it might require
these organizations to exercise additional care—and thus expend additional
costs—ensuring that their activities as structured would not be treated as
proxy advice under SEC rules. At worst, it could deprive investors of a
diversity of views on corporate governance and sources of information to
inform their votes, potentially reducing the quality of their voting decisions.
Moving briefly to the demand side, regulation that requires institutional
investors to undertake additional diligence in overseeing their proxy advisors
could lead these investors to decide that exercising their voting rights is not
worth the cost. To the extent such regulation leads institutional investors that
adopt blanket policies of voting with a proxy advisor to stop voting, this
regulation could be beneficial if it results in more informed and engaged
institutional investors’ having a greater voice in shareholder votes. If such
regulation leads relatively informed investors to disengage from voting,
however, then it may be harmful.
Timing may be relevant to drawing a prudent boundary between helpful
and harmful regulation. Because of the time crunch institutional investors
face during proxy season, rules that require them to exercise additional
diligence before casting their proxies seem likely to have the most significant
191. Cappucci, supra note 56, at 610–11.
192. Dent, supra note 154, at 1304–05.
193. See id. at 1302 (describing potential alternative sources of advice available to institutional
investors).
194. See Tuch, supra note 35 (discussing the rise of similar entities in the U.K. to fulfill functions
similar to those now fulfilled by proxy advisors in the United States). See also Edward J. Waitzer
& Douglas Sarro, Fiduciary Society Unleashed: The Road Ahead for the Financial Sector, 69 BUS.
LAW. 1081, 1103–04 (2014) (describing collaborative efforts by shareholders to foster good
governance).
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adverse effects on demand for proxy advice, especially if such requirements
do not reflect current market practice. Rules that require investors only to
review their votes after their proxies have been cast and address any
deficiencies discovered on a going-forward basis, as suggested in SLB 20,195
may be easier to implement and thus lead fewer investment advisers to cease
trying to cast informed votes.
B. REEVALUATING “ONE-SIZE-FITS ALL” STANDARDS
Understanding proxy advisors’ role as issue spotters casts one criticism
of the quality of proxy advisors’ standards—that they reflect a “one-size-fitsall” 196 or “cookie-cutter” 197 approach to analyzing the quality of issuers’
corporate governance that does not reflect each company’s unique set of
circumstances or investors’ diverse objectives198—in a new light that exposes
a potential weakness in these standards that is unaddressed by the SEC’s
reforms.
Critics of proxy advisors’ methodologies assert that, because good
governance requires different practices in different circumstances, one-sizefits-all policies must be low-quality, and institutional investors’ use of proxy
advisors that employ such policies means they must not be paying sufficient
attention to their obligations to exercise their voting rights prudently.199 The
SEC’s reforms reflect a more specific concern that these one-size-fits-all
policies result in too many negative (i.e., anti-management)
recommendations. Consider, for example, the SEC’s guidance emphasizing
that institutional investors should look for and place weight on issuers’
responses to proxy advisor recommendations, and its rules requiring proxy
advisors to have a framework in place for conveying issuers’ responses to
their clients. These reforms only come into play in the event of a
recommendation that management disagrees with—management will not
rebut a recommendation to vote “For” its own say-on-pay proposal, for
example.
To the extent institutional investors are using proxy advisors as issue
spotters, one-size-fits-all policies that err on the side of providing negative
recommendations can be seen in a different light. Crudely drawn cut-offs are
unlikely to achieve perfect recommendations, but they can quickly and
cheaply screen out votes that are clearly uncontroversial. To the extent an
195. SLB 20, supra note 60, at Question 1.
196. CTR. FOR CAPITAL MKTS. COMPETITIVENESS & NASDAQ, supra note 18, at 3; CHESTER S.
SPATT, PROXY ADVISORY FIRMS, GOVERNANCE, MARKET FAILURE, AND REGULATION 12–13
(2019), https://milkeninstitute.org/sites/default/files/reports-pdf/Proxy%20Advisory%20Firms%20
FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/9VYH-YVG8].
197. Letter from Tom Quaadman, Exec. Dir., Fin. Reporting and Inv’r Opportunity, Ctr. for
Capital Mkts. Competitiveness, to The Hon. Mary Schapiro, Chairman, SEC, at 3 (Aug. 5, 2010),
https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-14-10/s71410-26.pdf [https://perma.cc/GX92-P4YT].
198. Spatt, supra note 196, at 14; Copland, Larcker & Tayan, supra note 107, at 17.
199. See Copland, Larcker & Tayan, supra note 107, at 17.
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institutional investor wants to cast votes that reflect its objectives and hear
more from management on proposals the investor regards as controversial, it
may be to the investor’s advantage to hire a proxy advisor that uses crude
cut-offs that err on the side of contradicting management recommendations.
It allows the investor to deal quickly and cheaply with the massive proportion
of issues that clearly are uncontroversial while giving the investor freedom
to analyze and make prudent decisions on the limited universe of matters that
require closer judgment calls.
One-size-fits-all policies could fail, however, to the extent they err on the
side of supporting management recommendations. This is a problem the
reforms described above do not address, despite there being reason to suspect
that this problem exists. Public company managers have a strong interest in
designing governance and compensation structures to avoid proxy advisor
scrutiny, but not necessarily to design them in ways that further the objectives
behind proxy advisors’ voting standards. Managers can invest significant
time and effort to find creative ways to skirt these standards, possibly with
the assistance of the governance consultants housed within a proxy advisor’s
business. Managers might even try to game the various financial metrics
proxy advisors use to screen compensation proposals for further review.200
Proxy advisors’ research staff, by contrast, have limited time and other
resources to review the quality of these proposals and, assuming the firewalls
between research and governance consulting staff are effective, will not
know whether these proposals reflect advice from their in-house governance
consultants. Research uncovering the strong influence financial performance
metrics play in shaping ISS recommendations on say-on-pay votes, without
regard to the strength of the relationship between pay and performance
reflected in the compensation structures up for vote, could reflect efforts by
research staff to triage resources that result in poor compensation structures
slipping by.201
Proxy advisors and institutional investors likely will be unable to spot
these types of proposals in real-time without incurring prohibitive costs, but
retrospective analyses of proposals that may have been misclassified as
uncontroversial might foster gradual improvements in proxy advisors’

200. There has been at least some suggestion in the popular press that management may be able
to game these metrics. Shawn Tully, CEO Pay May Soon Face a New, Hard-to-Manipulate
Yardstick As ISS Embraces ‘EVA’, FORTUNE (Mar. 28, 2019), https://fortune.com/2019/03/28/issceo-pay-eva/ [https://perma.cc/P5ZW-AZ7P]. This practice does not appear implausible in light of
research highlighting CEOs’ tendency to cherry-pick peer groups to justify upward movements in
executive pay. See Mathijs de Vaan, Benjamin Elbers & Thomas A. DiPrete, Obscured
Transparency? Compensation Benchmarking and the Biasing of Executive Pay, 65 MGMT. SCI.
4299, 4299, 4315 (2019).
201. Fisch, Palia & Davidoff Solomon, supra note 113, at 116–117. To some extent, these triage
mechanisms likely also reflect proxy advisors’ anticipation of their clients’ preferences—even in
the face of a negative ISS recommendation, institutional investors are inclined to give a say-on-pay
proposal the benefit of the doubt if an issuer’s financial performance is deemed satisfactory. Id.
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standards. The SEC could provide guidance recommending that investment
advisers review, at least annually, a sample of the recommendations they
received from their proxy advisor to determine whether these
recommendations align with the objectives that underlie their proxy voting
policies. Investment advisers could be asked to focus their review on
relatively complex matters, such as say-on-pay votes, and provide feedback
to their proxy advisor based on this review. Such guidance would have the
added benefit of increasing institutional investors’ participation in the
ongoing development of proxy advisors’ voting standards, something which
has been lacking despite proxy advisors’ efforts to solicit their clients’
opinions on this front.202 Such guidance also would have the advantage of
being incremental—it builds on the guidance in SLB 20 recommending
retrospective reviews of proxy advisor recommendations.203 As a final note,
the DOL also could explore providing similar guidance to the investment
fiduciaries under its oversight.
C. IMPROVING DEBATE OVER PROXY ADVISOR
RECOMMENDATIONS
The Proposed Rules sought to address the perceived problem of lowquality proxy advisor recommendations through rules aimed at (i) improving
the quality of these recommendations by allowing issuers to review and
comment on draft recommendations; and (ii) signaling potential problems
with these recommendations to proxy advisors’ clients through enhanced
conflict of interest disclosures and measures that enhance issuers’
opportunity to respond to proxy advisor recommendations and place these
responses in front of investors. The Final Rules abandoned the first objective
but pressed forward with the second. Abandoning the first objective makes
sense: a prior issuer review period would have been highly burdensome given
the limited time proxy advisors have to formulate recommendations, and
probably unnecessary given that it appears institutional investors tend not to
blindly rely on proxy advisor recommendations. But the collection of
surviving measures designed to further the second objective is far from
unproblematic.
On an understanding of proxy advisors as issue spotters, the criterion for
evaluating these measures is whether they serve to provide signals that
meaningfully inform an institutional investor’s decision on a controversial
matter. To the extent these measures merely repeat information of which
institutional investors are already aware or signal risks that these investors

202. See David F. Larker, Allan L. McCall & Brian Tayan, And Then A Miracle Happens!: How
Do Proxy Advisory Firms Develop Their Voting Recommendations?, STAN. CLOSER LOOK SERIES
2 (Feb. 25, 2013), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2224329.
203. SLB 20, supra note 60, at Question 1.
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already mitigate through other means, the benefit of these measures is less
clear.
The Final Rules’ general requirement that issuers receive a copy of proxy
advisor reports at least contemporaneous with these reports’ distribution to
clients is most defensible under this criterion.204 This measure would help
ensure issuers have an opportunity to review these reports and formulate their
response, potentially placing relevant information in front of investors before
a vote. The costs of this requirement would seem relatively low. It would not
slow down or increase the burden of developing proxy advisor
recommendations. This requirement would not set the bar much higher than
current practice at ISS, which provides final copies of its reports to issuers
upon request, after dissemination to clients.205
The case for the Final Rules’ requirement that proxy advisors effectively
act as go-betweens between issuers and investors, notifying their investor
clients when an issuer plans to respond to one of their recommendations and
passing links to these responses when they become available on EDGAR, is
less clear. This measure seems predicated on the assumption that institutional
investors will not bother to look for or consider supplemental information
filed by issuers unless they receive it directly from their proxy advisor. On
the account adopted in this article, it stands to reason that institutional
investors will understand that, when a proxy advisor’s recommendation
diverges from that of management, management likely will seek to respond
and the investor will know to look for such a response. Requiring proxy
advisors to alert investors to such responses adds nothing new, while
imposing additional burdens on proxy advisors and creating an incentive for
them to provide less objective advice. An easy way to avoid the hassle of
checking for and relaying issuers’ notices and disclosures to clients, and limit
the risk of liability for failures to relay these messages in an effective way,
would be to simply issue more recommendations supportive of management.
To the extent the real problem is that issuers’ responses to proxy advisor
recommendations are difficult to find, a less burdensome alternative would
be to require proxy advisors to include in their reports a link to the relevant
issuer’s page on EDGAR, where any response filed by the issuer will become
available.206
Conflicts of interest are a legitimate concern, and the requirements
included in the Final Rules that proxy advisors provide disclosure about these
conflicts and how they are handled appear unobjectionable. 207 But their
204. This requirement appears in 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-2(b)(9)(ii)(A) (2020).
205. FAQs: Engagement on Proxy Research, ISS, https://www.issgovernance.com/contact/faqsengagement-on-proxy-research/ [https://perma.cc/3YBE-XMJP].
206. Letter from James C. Allen, Head, Capital Mkts. Pol’y, and Matt Orsagh, Dir., Capital Mkts.
Pol’y, CFA Inst., to Vanessa A. Countryman, Sec’y, SEC, at 4 (May 13, 2020), https://www.sec.gov
/comments/s7-22-19/s72219-7182919-216808.pdf [https://perma.cc/HG6Z-5LJR].
207. These requirements appear in 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-2(b)(9)(i) (2020).
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ultimate benefit may be marginal at best. The new disclosure requirements
mirror those applicable to research analysts, who must disclose if their firm
provides investment banking services to an issuer that is the subject of their
research, even if firewalls between the firm’s investment banking and
research services are in place.208 They also appear only to build incrementally
on proxy advisors’ existing practices for disclosing conflicts of interest: ISS
already has processes that allow their investor clients to find out whether an
issuer that is the subject of ISS research has received governance advice from
ISS.209 The Final Rules would, however, make this information easier for
investors to access. The benefits of this increased ease of access to more
specific information about proxy advisors’ conflicts of interest may be
muted, however, as institutional investors already appear aware that these
conflicts can arise and have employed various means of controlling for these
conflicts. For example, ISS’s efforts to isolate its proxy advisory and voting
practice from its corporate governance advisory practice 210 likely reflects
institutional investors’ attention to potential conflicts of interest and their
demand for mechanisms that address these conflicts. Institutional investors’
practice of hiring multiple proxy advisors can be viewed as yet another
mechanism by which they can avoid their votes’ being tainted by their proxy
advisors’ conflicts of interest 211 —competition among proxy advisors has
been cited as a factor that mitigates the harms that can come from conflicts
of interest.212
D. RESPONDING TO ROBO-VOTING
The SEC’s guidance stating that investment advisers should work to take
issuers’ responses to proxy advisor recommendations into account before

208. See, e.g., FINRA Rules 2241(b)(2), (c)(4), FINRA, https://www.finra.org/rulesguidance/rulebooks/finra-rules/2241 [https://perma.cc/2NU2-6WGF]. A research analyst also must
disclose various other relationships that could be material to the objectivity of their advice.
209. Letter from Gary Retelny, President & CEO, Institutional S’holder Servs., to Brent J. Fields,
Sec’y, SEC, at 14 (Nov. 7, 2018), https://www.issgovernance.com/file/publications/iss-roundtablecomment-letter.pdf [https://perma.cc/4MBJ-LACT].
210. INSTITUTIONAL S’HOLDER SERVS., DUE DILIGENCE COMPLIANCE PACKAGE 7–9, ISS
(2017), https://www.issgovernance.com/file/duediligence/Due-Diligence-Package-November2017
.pdf [https://perma.cc/VR8B-3J7M].
211. Amy Freedman & Ian Robertson, Kingsdale Advisors, Understanding the Impact of
America’s Clampdown on Proxy Advisors, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Nov. 10,
2019), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/11/10/understanding-the-impact-of-americas-clamp
down-on-proxy-advisors/
[https://perma.cc/5LSH-W73Z].
Competing
proxy advisors’
recommendations are far from uniform, such that hiring multiple advisors should tend to provide
investors with diverse views on matters up for vote. See, e.g., Ertimur, Ferri & Oesch, supra note
111, at 953 (finding that, with respect to the recommendations in their sample, ISS and Glass Lewis
agreed only 17.9% of the time when it came to “Against” recommendations).
212. Tao Li, Outsourcing Corporate Governance: Conflicts of Interest Within the Proxy Advisory
Industry, 64 MGMT. SCI. 2951, 2951 (2018).
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voting, 213 and apply a “higher degree of analysis” to matters relating to
corporate control, 214 is consistent with how one would expect investment
advisers and other institutional investors to act when they are using proxy
advisors as issue spotters and accordingly should be uncontroversial. Its
guidance indicating that investment advisers should consider sampling prepopulated votes to test for compliance with applicable voting policies before
these votes are cast215 may prove more burdensome to the extent it does not
already reflect market practice. The need for such guidance is also unclear.
If there were widespread problems with these votes, they would have been
revealed in the periodic, post-vote quality checks contemplated under SLB
20, yet the SEC’s new guidance points to no evidence of problems detected
in these quality checks that might justify asking investment advisers to take
the more burdensome step of carrying out these quality checks before votes
are cast.
A better area of focus would have been the small minority of institutional
investors that vote in line with proxy advisor recommendations close to 100%
of the time. If institutional investors (particularly those that are large and
well-staffed) tend to view proxy advisors’ one-size-fits-all voting standards
merely as simple ways of narrowing the universe of voting decisions that
require independent analysis, is it prudent for other institutional investors to
rely entirely on these recommendations in determining how to vote on all
matters?216 Even if an institutional investor does not view this approach as
prudent, it may have felt obligated under pre-2019 rules and guidance to cast
votes on all matters so long as it can afford to hire a proxy advisor to
automatically populate and cast its votes.217 While existing SEC guidance
discusses in general terms investment advisers’ ability to agree with their
clients to limit the scope of their obligation to exercise voting rights where
the costs of voting appear likely to exceed their benefits,218 the SEC could
add to this guidance by stating in clearer terms that these costs should be
viewed as including the cost of separately reviewing controversial matters.
Such guidance would give smaller institutional investors leeway to cut back
the amount of voting they engage in to reflect their more limited resources,
in turn lowering costs for these investors’ beneficiaries. Such guidance

213. This requirement is discussed in Supplemental Investment Adviser Guidance (2020), supra
note 68, at 55,156.
214. Investment Adviser Guidance (2019), supra note 66, at 47,424.
215. Id.
216. One can accept the prudence of using proxy advisors as issue spotters while still questioning
individual investors’ motivations behind their votes on controversial issues. Regarding these
potential motivations, see supra notes 163–164 and accompanying text.
217. Such an assumption could flow from the general statements in the Avon Letter and Proxy
Voting Rules that voting rights are fiduciary assets. See generally supra Part I.A. See also Copland,
Larcker & Tayan, supra note 107, at 17 (asserting that institutional investors “are required by the
SEC to vote all matters put forth on the proxy” (emphasis in original)).
218. SLB 20, supra note 60, at Question 2.
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should not substantially reduce demand for proxy advisors’ services, since it
appears institutional investors already tend to scrutinize proxy advisors’
analyses of controversial matters before casting their proxies.
At first glance, the DOL’s 2020 rulemaking could be seen as providing a
template for future SEC action on this issue. The DOL’s final rules state that
ERISA fiduciaries must consider the costs of voting, 219 and can address
situations where these costs appear likely to exceed the corresponding
benefits by adopting a policy limiting exercises of voting rights to specific
issues, specific companies in their portfolio, or some combination of the
two.220 The trouble is that these components may interact with at least two
other pieces of the rulemaking so as to do more than simply curb robo-voting.
First, the DOL’s instruction to focus exclusively on economic interests 221
skews the benefits side of the investor’s cost-benefit analysis, making
intervention on the environmental, social, and governance issues raised in
many shareholder votes more difficult to justify. Second, the instruction to
“[e]valuate material facts that form the basis for any particular proxy vote or
other exercise of shareholder rights”222 acts on the costs side of the analysis,
by implying that investors must spend resources separately evaluating even
non-controversial votes (as opposed to simply relying on their proxy
advisor’s recommendation). It is unclear what benefit is served by requiring
case-by-case evaluations of non-controversial votes, and as outlined in Part
II.C many investors likely would encounter significant difficulty meeting this
burden. In these ways, the DOL rulemaking seems to do more than just
discourage robo-voting—it seems to stack the deck to make shareholder
voting as a general matter more difficult to justify. As such, its components
should be viewed with caution in any review of the SEC’s approach to proxy
advisor regulation.
CONCLUSION
Neither of the two dominant accounts of proxy advisors’ influence over
their clients’ voting behavior appears to provide a complete picture of how
institutional investors use proxy advisors’ research and recommendations.
Contrary to what many proponents of additional proxy advisor regulation
assert, institutional investors do not seem to blindly follow the
recommendations of their proxy advisors regardless of the nature of the
recommendation. At the same time, however, it seems implausible that
institutional investors are using proxy advisors purely as research providers,
and as a result subjecting all matters up for vote to equivalent scrutiny. This
article argues that these accounts overlook an important role that proxy

219.
220.
221.
222.

29 C.F.R. § 2550.404a-1(e)(2)(ii)(B) (2020).
29 C.F.R. § 2550.404a-1(e)(3)(i) (2020).
29 C.F.R. §§ 2550.404a-1(e)(2)(ii)(A), (C) (2020).
29 C.F.R. § 2550.404a-1(e)(2)(ii)(D) (2020).
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advisors play: that of issue spotter. This role involves distinguishing
controversial votes from non-controversial votes so that institutional
investors can focus their limited resources on reaching decisions about
controversial votes. When a proxy advisor’s recommendation aligns with that
of management, this generally serves as a signal that the vote is
uncontroversial, and that the institutional investor should rely on the proxy
advisor’s recommendation without spending time reviewing the research
supporting that recommendation. When the opposite is true, this serves as a
signal that the vote is controversial, and accordingly that the institutional
investor should pay greater attention to the proxy advisor’s underlying
research and review additional sources (e.g., supplemental proxy materials
prepared by management) before voting.
Adopting a view of proxy advisors’ role that accounts for their function
as issue spotters leads to at least three implications for proxy advisor
regulation. First, contrary to critics’ assertion that proxy advisors’ voting
standards result in too many recommendations opposing management (as a
result of their being one-size-fits-all), the real problem may be that they result
in too few such recommendations. Managers could exploit weaknesses in
these standards to secure positive recommendations, such that problematic
practices escape investors’ notice. Guidance encouraging investment
advisers to review their past votes to identify potential weaknesses in their
proxy advisor’s voting standards and work with the proxy advisor to resolve
them could mitigate this risk. Second, regulation should focus on helping
investment advisers access new signals about the quality of proxy advisors’
recommendations, rather than reminding them of obvious issues that only a
“blind reliance” investor would miss (e.g., proxy advisors’ possible conflicts
of interest). Third, instead of imposing new procedural hurdles to voting on
all advisers, it may make more sense to give the small minority that cast their
votes in lockstep with these recommendations comfort that they can scale
back their exercise of voting rights while still complying with their fiduciary
obligations.

